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Introduction 
How can environmental policy evaluation be improved? 
 
2015 has been a tumultuous year for environmental policy in Australia. Major policy 
issues have been present in news reports for many aspects of the environment, from 
the Murray Darling Basin Plan, the Great Barrier Reef Plan, to the controversial 
approval of the Shenhua and Adani coalmines. The announcement of Australia’s 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions target also brought further public debate to the 
environmental policy realm in preparation for the 2015 United Nations Climate 
Conference in Paris. This was also the case in Australia’s renewable energy (RE) 
sector, which has been embroiled in fierce discussion at all levels of debate. This is 
the backdrop to which this thesis was written – amidst a tide of environmental issues, 
each unique in its players, problems, and its dynamics. Common to all, was the 
inescapable complexity and interdisciplinary nature of each issue. This thesis aims to 
improve environmental policy evaluation by engaging with this commonality.  
Why Environmental Policy Evaluation? 
This topic emerged from the notion that economic theories that have been challenged 
and disproven can still be resurrected to dominate the discourse of policy debate and 
decision-making - a phenomenon described as ‘Zombie Economics’ (Quiggin, 2010). 
Discussion of Australia’s Renewable Energy Target (RET) and the subsequent 2015 
RET amendments resonated with this concept, with examples of antiquated economic 
principles that have been reintegrated to justify the interests of agents in the policy 
arena. These ‘defunct’ ideas were then disseminated through the media, government 
agencies and the 2014 RET ‘Expert Panel’ Review (hereafter referred to as the 
Warburton Review). The limited critical engagement with the application of these 
ideas therefore became the catalyst for a topic that was as persistent as the ‘defunct’ 
ideas themselves.  
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Examining the dominant influence of economics in environmental issues exposed the 
significant challenge of this research question: how to evaluate policy in a way that 
rejected the ‘objectivity’ of evaluation and was founded on the notion that all agents 
have inextricable interests. The driving force of this research therefore became 
finding a mechanism to engage with policy evaluation that was systematic, able to 
explicitly engage with inevitable normativity, and acknowledge environmental policy 
as an open and complex process (Mickwitz, 2003, 416).  
 
This thesis explores a possible way forward through interdisciplinary policy theory, 
where the development of policy frameworks provides a systematic evaluative 
mechanism for analysis and knowledge building. Despite a long tradition of 
theoretical analysis, policy theory has been underutilised in current policy practice, 
particularly in evaluation (Chelimsky, 2012). This gap between the academic work 
conducted in this field and the implementation by policymakers is demonstrated by 
the inadequacy of the 2014 Warburton Review in engaging with broader notions of 
evaluation. Moreover, the current approaches have overlooked the significance of 
systematic knowledge building, with limited use of the common frameworks explored 
in policy theory.  
 
A preliminary application of the framework that analyses the 2015 amendments to 
Australia’s RET was chosen to demonstrate these ideas. This application was 
particularly chosen to encourage knowledge building in an under-developed, but 
developing area. The current Federal Government’s apathetic attitude to RE in 
Australia only adds to the importance of knowledge building in this field, and 
emphasises the need for research to continue through other channels. 
Theory 
This thesis starts from an interdisciplinary foundation. Environmental issues require 
an engagement with multiple disciplines, and this is a key strength of a policy 
framework. A framework is defined here as an independent and interdisciplinary tool 
that is able to engage with multiple theories and models, and is contingent on the 
phenomena being examined. This research engages particularly with four areas of 
literature: ecological and institutional economics in the critique and application of the 
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framework, and policy and evaluation theory in selecting and improving the 
framework. It also contributes to the strong unifying tradition of ecological and 
institutional approaches when examining environmental issues (Vatn, 2005; Adger 
and Paavola, 2005, 353).  
Ecological Economics  
Ecological economics begins from the foundation that the economy is situated within 
the global ecosystem (Eriksson and Andersson, 2010, 58). This approach engages 
with systems, identifying feedback loops and complex interdependencies that 
understand the world through evolutions of processes. This examines systems of both 
“biological and cultural change” (Costanza, Daly & Bartholomew, 1991, 7; Daly, 
1973 in Vatn, 2005, 242). Individuals are characterised as more than economic agents, 
as they can respond to ethical considerations beyond self-interest and engage in both 
individual and collective decision making processes (Hamilton, 1997, 39). The 
ecological approach emerged as an alternative to the conceptualisation of 
environmental issues using market principles, the singularity of exchange-valuation, 
and the monetisation of environmental phenomena (Hamilton, 1997, 43)1. This shift is 
achieved through “synthesising various types of economics, and moving back to an 
explicit inclusion of ethical issues in the mode of classical political economy” (Spash, 
1999, 413).    
Institutional Economics  
Institutional economics takes the conceptual foundation of an “open-ended 
evolutionary approach” that considers path-dependent institutional development 
(Hodgson, 2008, 157). This systems view of social phenomena is compatible with 
systems of ecological processes (Vatn, 2005, 249). Further, policy is conceptualised 
as an institutional phenomenon that is complex and contextually specific. Institutional 
analysis can “reveal structural causes of policy success or failure”, yet this makes 
systematic evaluation complex and often absent of definitive conclusions (Crabbe and 
                                                   
1  Some   literature  uses   the   term  only   to   refer   to   linking   ecology   and  mainstream  economics   (Spash,  
1999,   413).   Like   environmental   economics,   this   may   utilise   mainstream   notions   such   as   monetary  
valuation,  aiming  to  ensure  the  ‘true  values’  of  environmental  services  are  reflected  in  prices  paid  by  
those   who   use   them’   (Hamilton,   1997,   40;   see   for   example:   Longo,   et   al.,   2008).   The   ecological  
economics   discipline   is   therefore   is   not  without   internal   tensions.   It   is   diverse   and   complex,  with   a  
range  of  perspectives  and  approaches  (Spash,  1999,  422).  
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Leroy, 2008, 17, 21). Institutional approaches reject ‘value-free’ notions of social 
science, and question the legitimacy of current forms of institutional social 
organisation and power relations (Elliott, 2008, 153). This perspective therefore 
rejects individual preferences and values as given and stable, acknowledging instead 
the social foundation of preference formation (Vatn, 2005, 162). 
Methodology 
A pluralist methodology is utilised to engage with a range of theories and models that 
are relevant for environmental policy analysis.  This occurs through the examination 
of different ‘schools’ or systems of knowledge that inform methodology, each of 
which is a representation of reality (King, 2002, 85-86). According to Dow, “each 
school can support its approach to knowledge with reason, while recognising the 
legitimacy of alternative approaches. ... World-view and theory of knowledge cannot 
be eradicated; yet recognition of differences at this level allows for more reasoned 
debate over appraisal criteria and analysis of different methodologies” (Dow, 1996, 
45-46).  
 
Pluralism will, by definition, require certain methodological choices to be made by 
the researcher. Often, the outcomes of research are contingent on how this element of 
selectivity is engaged with. A comparative and selective plurality will therefore 
discern appropriate theory and models based on the issue-specific context. Further, 
the pluralist acceptance of incommensurability in engaging with inherently 
interdisciplinary phenomena paves the way for a richer explanatory capacity that 
engages with complexities of real world phenomena. Contextually specific selection 
places emphasis on the justification of this selectivity. Thus, the choice of a particular 
method or theory must be considered in tandem with the justification of this choice. 
Considering both these elements provides a holistic understanding of the underlying 
ideology or interests that frame these choices.  
 
This thesis accepts the assertion that in the social sciences, theoretical analysis is 
inseparable from normative considerations. This undermines the positivist claim that 
economics is, “in principle, independent of any particular ethical position or 
normative judgements” (Friedman, 1953, 1-4; 40-42). Alternatively, pluralism 
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encourages explicit analysis of the “value judgements and political ideologies [that] 
pervade economic thought” (Stilwell, 2006, 47). Acknowledging the impact of 
selective assumptions highlights the inescapability of normative claims and the 
inherently political nature of social science research. Pluralist approaches are 
therefore “capable of incorporating both the rigour of empirical science and the 
classical traditions of normative theory” (Fischer, 1995, ix-x).  
Key Concepts  
The following section explores the key concepts of the research question. In policy 
theory, different definitions may cause theorists to ‘talk past’ each other. To minimise 
this, specific definitions or approaches will be assumed.  
 
Environmental Policy 
Environmental policy is defined as “courses of action which are intended to affect 
society – in terms of values and beliefs, action and organization – in such a way as to 
improve, or to prevent the deterioration of, the quality of the natural environment” 
(Lundqvist 1996, in Mickwitz, 2006, 11). This purpose-based definition is 
incompatible with notions of policy integration, as a categorical separation of 
environmental policies is established through the definition (Mickwitz, 2006, 11). 
Further, consideration must be given to the impact of unintended consequences of any 
policy or regulation (Mickwitz, 2006, 12). Given the research intention to evaluate 
specific policies, this definition remains suitable, provided that the policy context, 
unintended consequences and adjacent policies are examined.  
 
RE Policy as Environmental Policy  
As a facet of environmental policy, RE2 policy research is central to debates on 
energy security, the future of energy production and is a major topic of discussion in 
long-term solutions to climate change. RE research therefore has a range of relevant 
implications for policy makers, businesses and citizens. However, the primarily focus 
here will be on the environmental policy implications of RE policy. While RE can be 
                                                   
2  RE   sources   are   defined   as   those   that   are   constantly   reproduced   and   naturally   replenished   in   a  
reasonable  period  of  time  (Eriksson  and  Andersson,  2010,  16).    
 13 
analysed entirely from within an energy policy perspective, the alignment of the 
RET’s stated aims with the definition of environmental policy utilised here enables 
the presumption of the RET as an environmental policy for this research (REE Act, 
2000).  
 
Post-Positivist Evaluation  
The pluralist tradition of post-positivst evaluation is an area that parallels the 
theoretical and methodological approach of this thesis. The impossibility of 
objectivity in post-positivist evaluation provides a foundation that justifies an 
interdisciplinary and pluralistic approach to knowledge building (Hanberger, 2001, 
47). It draws upon mixed-method evaluation to bridge the gap between evaluation 
theory and practice. This thesis utilises this approach in the capacity of ‘evaluation for 
knowledge’, which is conducted to “generate understanding and explanation”, and 
aims to “obtain a deeper understanding in some specific area or policy field” 
(Chelimsky, 1997, 102). This takes inspiration from Weberian ‘Entzauberung’ or 
‘disenchantment’, implying that evaluation aims to “de-mystify the prevailing myths” 
of policy. Evaluation can therefore provide “information in the public interest. … [It] 
is valuable if it produces strong information on subjects that are important for the 
public to know, even when use seems unlikely: for example, when there’s political 
unwillingness” (Chelimsky, 2010, 4).  
 
Environmental Policy Evaluation 
Environmental policy evaluation is defined as the “careful assessment of the merit, 
worth and value of administration, output and outcome of environmental policies, 
which is intended to play a role in [current and] future, practical action situations” 
(Vedung, 1997, 3, [own addition]). This definition was amended to recognise the 
dynamics of the present through ex nunc policy evaluation. An ex nunc, or ‘real time 
evaluation’ approach examines policy with a temporal consciousness that recognises 
the path dependency of policy development (Hanberger, 2001, 46). This moves 
beyond the dichotomy of ex post or ex ante policy evaluation (Mickwitz, 2006, 14; 
Mickwitz, 2003, 416; Crabbe and Leroy, 2008, 6). This definition further highlights 
the dynamic implementation and evaluation relation by linking ‘administration’ and 
‘outcome’, and the impact of unintended consequences by distinguishing ‘output’ 
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from ‘outcomes’ (Mickwitz, 2006, 15). This indicates policy evaluation is an ongoing, 
iterative process, which aims to amend policy toward better longer-term outcomes.  
 
Thesis Structure  
This research question is addressed by proposing a framework that draws from policy 
theory. Chapter 1 will critique economic approaches to current environmental policy 
evaluation. Ecological critiques of economic efficiency, environmental value and 
inter-temporal discounting in environmental policy are examined to demonstrate their 
implicit normative implications. This chapter also explores the translation of these 
assumptions to modelling techniques, demonstrating how an unfounded claim to 
objectivity itself has politically charged repercussions. The final section then 
examines how a solely economic approach may perpetuate this implicit agenda when 
the evaluative judgements align with the interests or ideology of agents in the policy 
process.   
 
Chapter two therefore utilises interdisciplinary innovations in policy theory. A set of 
criteria is assumed to determine an appropriate framework from the policy theory 
tradition. This builds on an existing framework by proposing modifications that 
broaden the applicability of the framework. In order to enhance the evaluative 
capacity of the framework, this chapter will also explore post-positivist evaluation 
approaches that foundationally reject objectivity in evaluation, facilitating instead a 
pluralistic and interdisciplinary form of knowledge building. This broader systematic 
approach can explicitly and holistically engage with both the interests of agents, and 
the inherent normativity of evaluation.  
 
In chapter three, a case study on the 2015 amendments to Australia’s RET is used as a 
preliminary application to test the proposed framework. While this research question 
remains within the realm of environmental policy, the concepts employed here are 
equally applicable to other areas of policy evaluation.  
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Chapter 1 
Environmental Policy: 
 Economic Approaches and Ecological Critiques 
 
“Climate change is the great moral challenge of our generation. [It] is not just 
an environmental challenge. Climate change is an economic challenge; a social 
challenge…” 
- Kevin Rudd  
Former Prime Minister 2007-2010; 2013 
National Climate Change Summit Speech 
 March, 2007 
1. Introduction 
 
This quote highlights the multifaceted and inescapably moral nature of environmental 
issues such as climate change policy. Despite the significant rhetoric that 
acknowledges the interdisciplinary nature of environmental issues, the dominance of 
economic traditions in environmental policy evaluation remains. This chapter will 
present key criticisms of common economic assumptions used in environmental 
policy analysis and therefore, policy evaluation. These critiques from ecological 
economics aim to dispel the prevalent myths in the evaluation process. Two key 
examples in environmental issues will be discussed: the use of economic valuation 
techniques and the ethical implications of inter-temporal discounting. The translation 
of these assumptions to modelling techniques will also be discussed, with a case study 
on two economic models used in the 2014 Warburton Review of the RET. These 
issues reveal the implicit normative imposition of economics in policy evaluation, and 
the implication of this will be discussed with reference to the alternative approach to 
environmental policy evaluation proposed in the following chapters.  
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1.1 The ‘Scientific Objectivity’ of Economics 
The study of economics as defined as the act of “studying how society manages its 
scarce resources”, and defines efficiency as “the property of society getting the most 
it can from its scarce resources (Mankiw et al. 2012, 3-4). Such definitions of 
economics implicitly perpetuate the ‘neutrality’ of economics, drawing on an earlier 
definition by Robbins, who asserts, “economics is neutral as between ends … 
Economics cannot pronounce on the validity of ultimate judgments of value” 
(Robbins, 1932, 131). This is reinforced in defining the methodology of economics. 
Friedman famously stated that: 
 
“Positive economics is, or can be, an "objective" science, in precisely the same 
sense as any of the physical sciences. … Economics as a positive science is a 
body of tentatively accepted generalizations about economic phenomena that 
can be used to predict the consequences of changes in circumstances” 
(Friedman, 1953, 4; 42). 
 
The highly mathematical methodology of mainstream economics stems from a 
tradition focused on emulating the methodology of ‘hard’ sciences3 (Benton and Craib, 
2001, 23-24). This combines the epistemological trends of empirical and rational 
thought, and manifests as a positivist approach with a foundation of deductivist 
axiomatic theory developed through academic abstraction (Dow, 1996, 11-13). This 
has translated into the general acceptance of mathematical models as simplifications 
for the economy (Dow, 1996, 72). 
 
These claims have led to the common presumption of the ‘scientific objectivity’ of 
economics, and reinforce economic efficiency criteria as a neutral arbiter in policy 
evaluation. This builds on the implicit “objective truth rule” that implies efficiency is 
both an accepted norm of ‘good’, and that this conclusion is determined through a 
neutral scientific methodology (Bromley, 1990, 87). However, economic efficiency as 
defined by either Pareto improvements or increases in net national income, is neither 
                                                   
3  While   both   the   precise   methodology   of   individual   economists   and   the   boundary   definitions   of  
‘mainstream’  varies  greatly,  mainstream  economics  can  be  “adequately  characterised  in  terms  of   its  
enduring  reliance,   indeed,  unceasing  insistence,  upon  methods  of  mathematical  modeling”  (Lawson,  
2013,  4  [italics  from  text]).    
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objective nor scientific. Economic efficiency implies normative implications that have 
become obscured through the development of the concept over time (Bromley, 1990, 
89).  
 
The use of Pareto optimality or the ‘broader’ Kaldor-Hicks condition4 therefore has 
significant repercussions in policy evaluation.   These limited axioms derive from 
welfare economics traditions, where the prioritisation of ‘allocative efficiency’ is at 
the expense of considering the distributional consequences. This at odds with the 
nature of public policy decision-making, which involves making distributional choices 
for current and future generations. “It matters a great deal whose welfare is improved 
and whose is impaired”, yet, this is unacknowledged by such minimalist axioms 
(Paavola and Bromley, 2002, 7 [emphasis from text]).  These axioms are translated to 
simplistic decision rules and are quantified in monetary terms through cost-benefit 
analysis (CBA) or economic modelling to yield outcomes in environmental policy 
evaluation (Guglyuvatyy, 2010, 356).  
 
The prevalence of these techniques in policy evaluation therefore becomes a 
mechanism by which to legitimate these normative claims under the guise of 
scientifically objective evaluation. Examining the unfounded claim of economics as a 
neutral arbiter of policy reveals the two key issues. First, the implicit politically 
charged consequence of assuming the ‘scientific objectivity’ of economics in 
evaluation, and second, the way this may align with the ideology or interests of agents 
who may benefit from the imposition of certain economic methods. Moving beyond 
this, and enacting “the abandonment of the usual efficiency norm liberates the 
economist to focus on evaluation analysis on those aspects of policy choices that 
matter most to those in a position to decide” (Bromley, 1990, 104). 
 
 
 
                                                   
4  The  Kaldor-­‐Hicks  requirement  attempts  to  broaden  the  possible  set  of  allocations  by  including  non-­‐
Pareto   improving   allocations,   so   long   as   those   individuals   made   worse   off   are   adequately  
compensated  to  the  equivalence  of  a  Pareto  improving  position  (Varian  2003,  15-­‐16).  
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1.2 Environmental Value 
By definition, conceptions of value are inescapable for any notion of evaluation. This 
is a rejection of the positivist “fact-value dichotomy”, which implies “empirical 
research is to proceed independently of normative context or implications” (Bernstein, 
1976; Proctor, 1991 in Fischer, 1998, 130). In environmental policy evaluation, how 
value is conceptualised is a critical component of the determination of outcomes in 
evaluation.  
 
There is widespread use of economic assumptions in determining value in 
environmental policy. Yet, the normative implications of these assumptions used in 
economic modelling are often left implicit, or are acknowledged only peripherally 
(Denniss, 2012, 4). These hidden assumptions may form the basis for the results of 
‘independent’ economic modelling, and become pivotal evidence in swaying policy 
decision-making, outcomes, and policy evaluation. The normative implications of 
mainstream valuation methods will therefore be examined.  
 
1.2.1 Traditional Approaches to Valuation 
Monetary valuation of the environment is the most common conceptualisation of 
value used in mainstream economic methods. It acknowledges environmental 
degradation as a market failure, and recharacterises nature as an input to the 
production process (Keohane and Olmstead, 2007, 65). This attempts to rectify 
market failure by ‘internalising the externality’; mapping a role for business and 
implying firms are responsible for the impact of their production processes on the 
environment (Gleeson-White, 2014, 62; Hamilton, 1997, 40). In its practical 
application, environmental market valuation is complementary to current market 
operations and methods, using traditional valuation techniques to obtain the dollar 
valuations on environmental resources and ecological systems5 (Costanza et al., 2014, 
152).  
 
 
                                                   
5  For   example,   the   “estimate   for   the   total   global   ecosystem   services   in   2011   is   $125   trillion/year  
(assuming   updated   unit   values   and   changes   to   biome   areas)   and   $145   trillion/year   (assuming   only  
unit  values  changed),  both  in  2007  $US”  (Costanza  et  al.,  2014,  152).  
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However, internalising an externality through a price mechanism implies firms will be 
able to pay that price, so if a particular model was too risk averse in assessing 
uncertainty, prices could be so prohibitive firms could not operate within these 
parameters (O’Neill, 2007, 42). The use of a price therefore becomes redundant if the 
contributing polluter cannot pay it. Models may therefore begin from the premise that 
there exists a price that can be paid to nullify environmental damage (O’Neill, 2007, 
45). This may encourage an undervaluation of resources and could lead to the 
destruction of irreplaceable ecological systems. 
 
Yet, innovations that are founded on these traditional economic valuation techniques 
are increasingly adopted globally. Recent developments have proposed integrating 
these concepts globally through a radical overhaul of the current International 
Accounting Standards, implementing a ‘six capitals’ system (Gleeson-White, 2014, 
174-178). This broadens the definition of capital to include a broader classification 
system that includes the environmental capital in integrated reporting. These 
monetising concepts are also applicable nationally in the calculation of aggregate 
domestic output, where resource consumption is considered as a variable in the 
production of output. In traditional macroeconomic indicators, this may be 
represented as a shift towards accounting for net domestic product, instead of gross 
domestic product (Daly, 1996, 99-100).  
 
For example, the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) began annually releasing the 
‘Australian Environmental-Economic Accounts’ in 2014, a statistical summary which 
“brings all ABS environmental accounts together in one place to deliver a broad and 
cohesive picture of the environmental stocks and flows of relevance to the Australian 
economy and society” (ABS, 2014, 2). Valuing the environment as capital in this way 
implies that the value of the environment derives primarily from its economic value, 
often expressed in monetary terms.   
 
Further, this approach and the resultant innovations are criticised for the implicit 
promotion of marketisation of the natural environment (Gleeson-White, 2014, 81). 
Engaging firms in ‘green accounting’ may distort the moral arguments for 
environmental preservation. Market principles encourage a price, and this may 
become a signal of the cost at which environmental preservation can be ‘bought off’ 
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(Sandel, 2012, 10). This is an example of the “corrosive tendency of markets” which 
not only allocates goods with certain implicit moral judgment, but also “express and 
promote certain attitudes toward the goods being exchanged” (Sandel, 2012, 8-10). 
Like markets, this approach to the environment can distort values and alter incentives. 
The moral arguments made about the commonplace implicit or explicit monetary 
valuation of traditionally unpriced components of the environment highlight the 
inescapable moral implications of these economic techniques.  
 
1.2.2 Cost-Benefit Analysis 
CBA is one of the key tools recommended by the Australian Government for 
environmental policy evaluation (Commonwealth of Australia, 2006; Commonwealth 
of Australia, 2014; NSW Treasury, 2007).  The use of economic valuation techniques 
in CBA is criticised for over-simplifying the worth of a system to prices. It is argued 
that standard valuation outcomes of CBA are inaccurate and implausible, that the use 
of discounting trivialises future harms, that questions of fairness and morality are 
excluded, and that CBA is neither objective nor transparent (Ackerman and 
Heinzerling, 2002, 1563). Traditional valuation techniques like CBA give the 
impression of scientific calculations for environmental value, yet the assumptions 
used as inputs to this process are criticised as unavoidably arbitrary in assigning a 
specific dollar valuation (O’Neill, 2007, 23-24). Uncertainty of future and current 
outcomes, costs, impacts and responses create many informational asymmetries in the 
CBA process, which are estimated based on calculated probabilities. Inherent 
uncertainty is a significant problem for environmental modelling, and highlights the 
infinite possibilities of a justifiable predictive model. In this context therefore, a 
particular model will always carry an element of arbitrariness.  
 
Broader analytical approaches to value highlight the constitutive incommensurability 
of markets and the environment, suggesting CBA is unable to account for 
distributional consequences or explain the reasoning for individual preferences 
(O’Neill, 2007, 24; 26-29). CBA reveals an “efficient use of means to ends, but does 
not tell us what our environmental goals should be” (Ackerman and Heinzerling, 2002, 
1583). It cannot explain why we value the environment, or the reasons for doing so, 
as preferences are taken as given (O’Neill, 2007, 28).  
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1.2.3 Non-market Valuation Techniques 
Non-market valuation techniques are also used in CBA and include techniques such 
as revealed preference, stated preference and benefit transfer (Baker and Ruting, 2014, 
6-7). These non-market techniques are an alternative way environmental preservation 
could be implemented, indicating the varying degrees of policy implications that stem 
from how a particular environmental price is used. This approach builds on 
counterarguments that suggest assigning a dollar value does not causally imply 
marketisation or privatisation (Costanza, 2014, xi-xx). For example, environmental 
(and some ecological) economists point to the existence of the statistical life6, arguing 
this does not imply humans should be traded in markets as commodities, and that 
environmental valuation should be treated similarly (Gleeson-White, 2014, 92-93). It 
is argued that the price of the environment already exists in global accounting and 
business practices - the problem is that this purchase price is currently zero (Everard, 
2014 in Gleeson-White, 2014, 95).  
 
Whilst such techniques are advocated as methods to improve environmental valuation, 
the criticisms raised earlier apply equally to these techniques. Their increasing input 
into CBA does not alter the normative implications of using monetary valuation. 
Therefore, what both these valuation perspectives have in common is the idea that the 
environment can, and should be priced. Both market or non-market techniques imply 
the naturalisation and inevitability of the penetration of markets and economic 
methods in the environmental sphere, and therefore, environmental policy evaluation.  
 
1.2.3 Nature as Priceless and Pluralism of Ecological Value  
Viewing nature as ‘priceless’ counters mainstream valuation techniques, 
environmental marketisation, and the monetary quantification of the worth of 
environmental systems. The theoretic proliferations of this perspective range from the 
rejection of monetary valuation of environmental systems, the rejection of traditional 
valuation techniques, to the intrinsic value of the environment above servicing the 
                                                   
6  According  to  the  Office  of  Best  Practice  Regulation,  Department  of  the  Prime  Minister  and  Cabinet,  
the  “estimate  of  the  value  of  statistical  life  is  $4.2m  and  the  value  of  statistical  life  year  is  $182,000  in  
2014  dollars”  (Commonwealth  of  Australia,  2014,  1). 
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needs of humanity and the capitalist economy. Some proponents of this perspective 
explicitly reject monetary based CBA, presenting a potentially damning critique that 
proposes alternative regulatory and valuation techniques to advance the case for 
environmental protection (Ackerman and Heinzerling, 2002, 1562). It also suggests a 
type of implicit valuation that focuses on policy mechanisms, acknowledging that a 
singular dollar value is not needed to implement regulatory controls.  
 
Pluralist approaches highlight valuation as a process within evaluation, rejecting the 
need for a transcendent or perfect notion of value. “Our evaluative experiences, and 
the judgments based on them, are deeply pluralistic” (Anderson, 1995, 1). 
Incorporating a plurality of values and voices can acknowledge competing 
perspectives through public reasoning and deliberation (Demals and Hyard, 2014, 36). 
This can overcome the “reason and distributional blindness” of mainstream 
approaches, and highlights the environmental valuation as contextually dependent on 
the issue, agents and entities involved (O’Neill, 2007, 41-43). Mainstream economic 
assumptions therefore normatively imply the value of the environment through 
specific valuation techniques. These techniques obscure the normative claims of 
assuming the environment can be priced or marketised, and that ecological value is 
derived only from its relation to economic phenomena.  
 
1.3 Ethics, Environment and Intergenerational Equity 
Mainstream economic valuation methods highlight one way economic assumptions 
impose specific moral conclusions about the worth of the environment. Similarly, 
inter-temporal assumptions used in economic models of environmental policy issues 
also have moral implications. Classical political economists discussed issues of 
economic significance in the context of broader moral concepts7. Over time, however, 
this moral context has been gradually detached and obscured from the influence of 
economics in environmental policy issues, reinforcing the ‘scientific objectivity’ of 
                                                   
7  An  example   is   the   ‘Adam  Smith  Problem’.  An  exclusive   reading  of  either   the  Wealth  of  Nations  or  
the   Theory   of   Moral   Sentiments   may   lead   to   contrasting   conclusions,   which   can   be   considered  
irreconcilable   (Sen,  2009,   xi).  However,   these  can  be   interpreted  cohesively,   as   they  were  originally  
written   and   concurrently   revised.   Together,   they   present   a   holistic   and   explicit   moral   view   of   the  
Smith’s  19th   century   society,  where  economic   issues  were  not   conceivable  as   independent  of   social  
phenomena.   The  meaning   of   ‘economy’   did   not   imply   a   separate   entity   until   the   1930’s   (Mitchell,  
2005,  131).    
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economics. The re-inclusion of the moral implications of economic theory and 
methods therefore represents a return to earlier traditions of classical political 
economic traditions.  
 
1.3.1 Intergenerational (In)Equity? 
Intergenerational equity (IGE) features frequently in environmental ethics, yet these 
discussions are largely separate to the assumptions of economic approaches. In 
economics, these principles manifest in the application of discount factors to applied 
economic modelling and forecasting, which are key tools for evaluation. The 
presumption of discount factors in modelling therefore has major ethical implications 
for the outcomes that result in environmental policy evaluation. Mainstream 
economics has often avoided engaging with these normative issues, instead focussing 
on formal mathematical analysis to derive an appropriate social discount rate.  
 
The historical development of political economy highlights the derivation of 
mainstream economics from the utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham, developing over 
time toward supposedly value-free and amoral preference theory (Spash, 2009, 12). In 
economic techniques such as CBA, moral choices are often taken as given from 
economic welfarist traditions. These are commonly assumed through the principles of 
utility maximisation, and the translation of simplistic utilitarian axioms into 
aggregated social welfare absolutes. Converting this to a monetary figure translates 
ordinal preferences into an implicit value theory that uses money as “a cardinal 
measure for interpersonal comparisons of well-being”  (Spash, 2009, 15). This is the 
process by which philosophical discussions on the implications of economic axioms 
and assumptions are divorced from economic methods to reinforce their objectivity 
(Bromley, 1990, 97).  
 
1.3.2 IGE and Discount Rates  
An example of the mainstream economic approach to discount rates is a report 
commissioned by the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which consults a 
panel of notable economists including Arrow, Nordhaus, and Weitzman (Arrow, et al., 
2012). The reported findings of this panel highlight the differences in approaches to 
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discount rates. Consensus among the panel recognised select methods as appropriate 
for intergenerational discounting:   
 
“Under certain assumptions—and ignoring uncertainty—this approach 
leads to the Ramsey discounting formula, in which the discount rate 
applied to net benefits at time t, ρt, equals the sum of the utility rate of 
discount (δ) and the rate of growth in consumption between t and the 
present (gt), weighted by (minus) the elasticity of marginal utility of 
consumption (η): ρt = δ + η·gt ” (Arrow et al, 2012, 2). 
 
However, a divergence among the panel occurred in determining the Ramsey 
equation parameters. This issue also drew major debate in criticisms of the well-
publicised 2007 Stern Review (Caney, 2014, 323; Weitzman, 2007, 703). Stern and 
others have argued for a utility rate of discount to be zero, ie. δ = 0, a derivation that 
explicitly assumes the principal of IGE, with the equal weighting of current and future 
generations consumption. However, others recommend that these parameters should 
be calculated based on empirical analysis of market interactions and trade offs (Arrow 
et al., 2012, 4).  
 
The social discount rate used in CBA or impact analyses is often justified using the 
utilitarian assumptions of Pareto optimality or the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, which 
determine the net impact on welfare over time. In the context of energy policy, Sen 
acknowledges the inescapable ethical character of a chosen discount rate when 
making social assumptions in CBA. However, through an examination of social 
welfare functionals, he further argues that the Pareto optimality condition is 
“inadequate to sustain ethical analysis involving equity, liberty, or even utilitarianism” 
(Sen, 1982, 350).  
 
1.3.3 Non-Utilitarian Ethical Approaches  
Using CBA or common orthodox assumptions implies that in decision making, that 
individuals follow a utilitarian philosophy, implying they “believe the net utility from 
the consequences of an action determines whether that action is right or wrong” 
(Spash, 1997, 404). Common economic valuation techniques used in CBA therefore 
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do not provide any scope for capturing preferences held by an individual with 
principles-based, rights-based or deontological approach to society or the 
environment. The incompatibility of these values with common valuation techniques 
means only the views of those with utilitarian values regarding the environment are 
recorded, or those with these alternative philosophical perspectives are forced to 
conform to a utilitarian preference system in data capture (Spash, 1997, 405).  
 
Rejecting these ethical positions implies perspectives that highlight the inherent value 
of the environment are incompatible and disregarded, and the imposition of falsely 
‘neutral’ economic analysis therefore reinforces a purist utilitarian standpoint. This 
impossibility is described as a representation of lexicographic preferences:  
 
“The utility functions are undefinable for an individual since the axiom of 
continuity is violated, and indifference curves collapse to single points 
denying the principle of gross substitution. Lexicographic preferences are 
conveniently regarded as unrealistic and unlikely to occur in economics” 
(Malinvaud, 1972, p. 20 in Spash, 1997, 406). 
 
The rejection of the compensation principle in deontological perspectives implies that 
no amount of money could ever compensate for the inherent value of a certain action 
or good. It is therefore an outright rejection of the narrow mainstream definition of 
rationality. Yet, such perspectives may be common among conservationists or 
environmentalists, implying that current economic methods are incapable of 
accounting for alternative ethical positions. This highlights the tension in maintaining 
an isolated economic approach to environmental issues. The need to engage with 
ethical considerations demonstrates the instability of monistically applying orthodox 
economics in environmental issues that are, by nature, interdisciplinary (Mickwitz, 
2003, 416; Beder, 2011, 140). In advocating for moral pluralism, Brennan notes, 
“there is no single theoretical lens which provides a privileged set of concepts, 
principles and structure in terms of which a situation can be viewed. … One and the 
same case can properly be viewed in many different ways” (Brennan, 1992, 29).  
 
Obscuring the weak ethical underpinnings of discount rates therefore has significant 
normative implications.  By operating under the false notion of scientific objectivity, 
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the use of social discount rates is therefore advancing a specific set of normative 
principles that have little concern for equity issues. Implicitly implementing these 
principles in environmental policy evaluation under the guise of neutrality therefore 
has political ramifications. IGE is therefore an example within environmental policy 
evaluation that ethical considerations must be explicitly engaged with. The 
implication of parameter choice for discount rates, and the limited strength of ethical 
considerations in welfare economic theorems highlight the need to explicitly 
acknowledge and integrate ethical considerations into economic thinking, in a return 
to classical political economy.  
 
1.4 Economic Modelling and the Environment: A Case Study 
Economists and modellers are often seen as independent arbiters in environmental 
policy evaluation. Common policy practice involves the inclusion of an economic 
perspective to bring a necessary ‘rational’ or ‘efficient’ approach. As demonstrated 
earlier, this notion is ill conceived on two accounts. First, the discipline of economics 
has a fundamental set of moral assumptions underlying its key theories and models. 
Second, the key tools used by economists to model environmental policy such as 
CBA are contingent on the assumptions used, implying the generated outcomes of 
such a model can be modified to suit the interests or ideological agenda of agents in 
the policy process. This can be demonstrated in the use of fallible economic 
modelling. Techniques to evaluate environmental policy are misused, and are 
misleading when implemented as a sole mechanism for evaluation. The subjective 
and malleable nature of these models will be explored in the 2014 modelling of the 
Australia’s RET for the Warburton Review.  
 
1.4.1 Economic Modelling and Environmental Policy 
A model is “a simplified representation of a more complex mechanism”, that for 
economists, has become a key tool to create “a mathematical representation of the 
linkages between selected elements of the economy” (Denniss, 2012, 1-2). Any model, 
by definition, has a set of assumptions that underpin the models outcomes or forecasts. 
Choices on which model to use, modifications to model structure and key 
assumptions are informed decisions made by technically trained modellers. Yet, the 
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selectivity of certain assumptions can promote a desired outcome. This prompts a 
potential ‘circular argument’ problem in economic modelling. Such a problem occurs 
if the assumptions are distorted and set up in a certain way that predicts the intended 
outcome, in effect creating a “process of recycling assumptions” (Denniss, 2012, 3).  
This then translates to a non-economic audience through press releases and media, 
where essential contextual assumptions can be obscured in a way that supports a 
desired outcome, potentially the outcome desired by the entity funding the study 
(Denniss, 2012, 5). This is amplified in economic modelling of environmental issues, 
in which strong assumptions are required to overcome significant levels of inherent 
uncertainty in prediction and forecasting.  Climate change is one such example where 
“political opponents of policies to mitigate climate change have promoted spurious 
uncertainty to provide a justification for their position” (Quiggin, 2008, 203). 
Modelling can therefore be commissioned to justify or obscure the interests of agents 
in the policy process.  
Limitations are also placed on the ability of economic modelling as a methodology to 
inform policy decision-making and evaluation. According to a 2001 report by the 
Australian Government’s Productivity Commission (PC), the inability for economic 
modelling to account for non-price based policy mechanisms means that “as well as 
setting sound price-based policies, governments can and should act to research, 
coordinate, inform and motivate the technical, institutional and cultural changes that 
also have a significant role in controlling GHG emissions” (Pezzey and Lambie, 2001, 
83). This implies that the problem with economic modelling is not simply one of 
inadequate or poorly applied models (though that's a problem too). Rather, this speaks 
to the limitation of the single-minded application of mathematical models in 
evaluating or explaining phenomena. 
 
1.4.2 Modelling the RET: Complications for RE Policy Evaluation 
One such example is the modelling on electricity prices conducted for the 2014 
Warburton Review. Most models submitted for review were variations of mainstream 
methodology, with (sometimes) empirically based parameters. Often, these 
parameters are derived from unrealistic neoclassical theoretical conclusions and form 
the bulk of the models assumptions (Scrieciu, 2007, 679). The following section will 
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compare the findings of two of the most prominent and widely cited models; the 
economic modelling commissioned by the government sponsored review, conducted 
by ACIL Allen Consulting (‘the ACIL model’), and the response modelling report by 
Deloitte Access Economics, as commissioned primarily by the Australian Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry (ACCI), the Business Council of Australia (BCA) and the 
Minerals Council of Australia (‘the Deloitte model’).  
 
The RET sets a fixed figure equivalent of 20% renewable generated electricity by 
2020 (on 2010 electricity demand forecasts), and current planned targets are 
implemented until 2030. The key difference in the two models is highlighted by the 
long-term outcomes, where results are increasingly subjective and specifically subject 
to the assumptions on uncertainty and future conditions by the modeller. Relating the 
major finding of both reports: 
 
 “Deloitte modelling shows that continuation of the RET would see annual 
household electricity costs rise in the range of $47 to $65 per annum by 
2030. This compares with an increase of around $54 per year through to 
2020 as forecast by ACIL Allen, commissioned by the Australian 
Government, followed by a decrease in electricity prices by an average 
$56 per year to 2030” (BCA, 2014, 1 [own emphasis]).  
 
These results are relatively concurrent over the period to 2020, however the 
divergence beyond 2020 highlights contradicting findings (Deloitte, 2014, 2). The 
predictions of the Deloitte model and associated assumptions are also in contrast to 
the modelling conducted by Bloomberg New Energy Finance (BNEF) and by ROAM 
Consulting on behalf of the Clean Energy Council, which both largely align with the 
ACIL models (Cox and Hannam, 2014; ROAM, 2014, 1-3; BNEF, 2014 in 
Warburton Review, 2014, 18).  
 
According to the Deloitte report, “the differences in the two analyses appear to arise 
from differences in the capital costs, fuel and contracting”. It was further stated that 
compliance costs for the RET would increase. In the modelling, “retail electricity 
prices increase by more than the reduction in wholesale prices. Overall, this results in 
a net increase in electricity prices” (Deloitte, 2014, 2). In contrast, the government 
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ACIL modelling predicted RET compliance costs would decline till 2030, and 
wholesale energy prices were predicted to be lower than if the RET was repealed 
(ACIL Allen, 2014, 3). 
 
1.4.3 CGE Modelling: Garbage in, Garbage Out?  
Computational general equilibrium (CGE) models are one of the most common 
economic modelling tools for evaluating environmental issues, as they are suitable for 
long-run policy analysis. In light of the Lucas Critique8, CGE relies on simulation 
modelling of the entire economy, making it better suited to analysing environmental 
issues like climate change or renewable energy, as these require long term effects of 
policy measures on prices and the whole economy (Denniss, 2012, 9). Both ACIL and 
Deloitte used in-house CGE modelling to determine the impact of various scenario 
changes to the RET on electricity prices for consumers, modelling the ‘business as 
usual’ and the repeal case.  
 
The PC report discussed earlier highlights some problematic assumptions in inferior 
CGE models. For example, many CGE models (such as the two discussed above) do 
not endogenise technological progress and this can be of significant concern in 
medium to long-range analysis of industry-based behaviour such as the renewables 
sector (Pezzey and Lambie, 2001, 82; Hamilton and Quiggin, 1997, 16). Further, the 
reliance on microeconomic foundations for assumptions not easily determined from 
empirical evidence has potentially limiting effects on modelling applicability (Dow, 
1996, 70-71). Assumptions such as the representative household are used, such that in 
the Deloitte model, “each region in the model has a so-called representative 
household that receives and spends all income” (Deloitte, 2014, 36). The use of 
representative entities may have implications for the ability of a model to predict 
distributional consequences (Pezzey and Lambie, 2001, 83). Neither model analysed 
here presented information regarding the dispersed burden faced by different sectors 
of the community in electricity prices. Given the widespread use of such models in 
                                                   
8  The  Lucas  Critique  challenges  time-­‐series  forecasting  due  to  the  limitations  of  adjustment  to  shocks  
outside  the  aggregated  historical  data.  This  critique  shifted  modelling  to  more  stochastic  (rather  than  
deterministic)  models  where  simulations,   rather   than  historical  data,  are   relied  upon   (Snowdon  and  
Vane,  2005,  26).    
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environmental policy evaluation, there is a significant imperative to explicitly 
examine the economic assumptions that underpin their legitimacy. 
 
1.5 An Alternative Interdisciplinary Approach 
An ecological perspective on mainstream economic notions of environmental value 
and the implicit ethics of social discount rates reveals the normative implications of 
economic assumptions. These underlying normative judgments are then reinforced 
through their common evaluative tools such as economic modelling or CBA. These 
are imbued with false notions of scientific objectivity. Obscuring these assumptions, 
and their use in economic methods of evaluation downplays the subjective nature of 
selection in economic modelling: 
 
“Since analysis almost always requires judgement about what data to use, 
what models and analytic methods to employ, what assumptions to begin with, 
how to characterise uncertainties, and other choices, analysts cannot escape 
the need to make ethical choices based on how they understand their role and 
what expectations guide them” (Weimer and Vining, 1999, 47-53, in Bryner, 
2006, 434). 
 
The use of these ‘independent’ models on evaluation outcomes is demonstrated in the 
modelling submissions for the Warburton Review. Economic techniques examined in 
this chapter can be used to perpetuate the interests or ideology of agents in the policy 
process, by using selective assumptions that presuppose the outcomes of modelling. 
This may also have been reinforced through the normative repercussions of 
economics on notions of equity or value, which may align in evaluation to further the 
interests of agents.   
 
Economists may assert a counter argument that ethical, institutional, political or social 
complexities should be left to the corresponding discipline, reinforcing the notion that 
“positive” economics ought to avoid engaging with explicitly normative issues or 
non-economic phenomena. However, as demonstrated here, the conclusions drawn 
from the linear focus and methodology of economics are limited when monistically 
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applied to interdisciplinary issues. A purely economic approach to policy evaluation 
does not mitigate the potential susceptibility of agents utilising an approach to further 
their own interests or ideology.  
 
The Warburton Review and the Federal Government’s response is an example of the 
insufficiency of a piecemeal amalgam of discipline-specific approaches. Given the 
epistemological impossibility of objective evaluation raised in post-positivist 
evaluation approaches, relying solely on economic modelling and its underlying 
assumptions is insufficient in accounting for the interests that arise in policy-making. 
This example is characteristic of a broader trend within policy evaluation practice that 
is perhaps symptomatic of a disconnection between evaluation theory and practice 
(Chelimsky, 2012, 91).  
 
Evaluating environmental policy issues is therefore improved by an approach that 
begins from an interdisciplinary foundation (Beder, 2011, 149). Any discipline will 
prioritise certain concepts, just as economics prioritises economic efficiency: 
 
“[N]one of the disciplines combine all concerns. An efficient and effective 
policy might still be defective if, for instance, it dangerously compromises 
equity. In a similar vein, hypothetical equity of a policy would not 
rationalise its lack of efficiency and environmental effectiveness. For that 
reason, all of the corresponding factors need to be considered 
simultaneously” (Guglyuvatyy, 2010, 357). 
 
This considers political and economic notions within a holistic understanding of 
society, as “each discipline, and practice, enters inevitably into the field of the other 
… economic processes and interests ‘shape political issues and measures’ [and] 
government policy, in turn, ‘increasingly shapes the course of economic affairs’ ” 
(Clarke, 1957; Hamilton, 1957 in Elliott, 2008, 153). Explicitly engaging with the 
limitations and normative implications outlined here does not make the economist 
obsolete in policy evaluation. Rather, this reconceptualises their role “as centrally 
concerned to assist the decision making in selecting choices that are consistent with 
the latters objectives” (Bromley, 1990, 15-16). 
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This thesis will now explore a holistic systems-approach that counters elements of 
traditional economic reductionism by understanding policy problems not as isolated 
issues, but as specific to their political economic context in a broader system of social 
and ecological mechanisms and structures. Beginning from this perspective can 
therefore account for the inherently political and subjective nature of policy 
evaluation, and endogenise the inevitability of active agents with interests in the 
policy process. The following chapter examines this approach in policy theory 
analysis.  
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Chapter 2 
A Framework for Environmental Policy Evaluation 
“Collective choice situations are most properly modeled as situations in 
which individuals and groups of individuals have interests in particular 
outcomes … We can either undertake to design an evaluation paradigm that 
recognizes and contributes to this reality, or we can persist in hiding behind a 
bogus and quite irrelevant façade that makes us feel good – and look bad”. 
 - Bromley, 1990, 105-106. 
2. Introduction 
As discussed previously, the limitations of current economic approaches to 
environmental policy has potentially problematic implications for environmental 
policy evaluation. This chapter seeks to propose an alternative approach to current 
economic evaluation mechanisms. It will do this by beginning from a foundation of a 
systematic and interdisciplinary analysis and will draw from sub-disciplines of policy 
theory. 
 
The first half of this chapter explores policy framework theory, examining 
mechanisms for improving environmental policy evaluation through frameworks for 
systematic knowledge building. A number of policy frameworks are considered for 
this evaluative task, with a comparative focus on the two most promising: the 
Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) and the Institutional Analysis and 
Development (IAD) framework. The conclusion of this comparative exploration will 
justify the selection of the IAD framework for environmental policy evaluation. 
Concepts from evaluation theory are then explored, a tradition that has developed 
independently from the policy framework literature. Key developments from the post-
positivist evaluation literature will then be incorporated to examine and broaden the 
evaluative capacity of the IAD framework in order to enhance the framework for the 
task of environmental policy evaluation. Chapter 3 will then carry out a preliminary 
application of the IAD in a case study on the 2015 amendments to Australia’s RET. 
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2.1 Policy Framework Theory 
The use of frameworks is widespread as a systematic mechanism for analysis in 
policy literature. However, few theorists explicitly engage with a framework as 
distinct from theories or models, or its specific purpose or role (Schlager, 2007, 294). 
Policy framework theorists are characterised here as those who explicitly engage with 
and develop policy frameworks for the purpose of systematic knowledge building in 
policy analysis. This section explores the epistemological foundation, definition, and 
major justifications for a framework. The implications of this definition and the 
necessity of a framework for environmental policy evaluation will also be discussed. 
 
2.1.1 Epistemology and Policy Frameworks  
In contrast to positivist economics, notions of a framework for knowledge building 
links to the epistemology of Laudan’s ‘research traditions’, where scientific progress 
is characterised as a process of problem solving (Hung, 2013, 402; Weible et al., 2011, 
351). Notions of research traditions developed in contrast to the approaches of Kuhn’s 
scientific paradigms and Lakatos’ research programs (Laudan, 1978, 70). 
Characterising science as “problem solving” emphasises the need for a comparative 
approach to theories and models that aims to explain a particular phenomena. 
Differing theoretical perspectives are commensurable, and a comparison of theories is 
necessary to solve a particular scientific problem in the pursuit of scientific progress 
(Laudan, 1978, 72-82). In this context, frameworks “serve as a platform for groups of 
scholars to work together toward common understandings and explanations of 
phenomena” (Weible and Nohrstedt, 2012, 126). A framework therefore provides the 
foundation to comparatively explore theories and models, thereby contributing to a 
body of knowledge that can withstand critical scrutiny.  
 
2.1.2 Defining ‘framework’ 
Most commonly, a framework is used to provide an overarching structure to 
conceptual or analytical work. However, reframing social scientific inquiry as 
research traditions for knowledge building imbues the use of a framework with more 
significant justifications. Constructing clear boundaries between framework, theory 
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and model therefore reinforces knowledge building through a comparative approach, 
as defined by Ostrom: 
  
“Framework:  identifies, categorizes, and organizes those factors deemed most 
relevant to understanding some phenomenon. 
 
Theory:  posits general causal relationships among some subsets of these 
variables or categories of factors, designating some types of factors as 
especially important and others as less critical for explanatory purposes. 
 
Model:  specifies the specific functional relationships among particular 
variables or indicators that are hypothesized to operate in some well-defined 
set of conditions” (McGinnis, 2011, 170). 
 
Such a delineation is often unclear in policy studies, lessening the possibility for “a 
certain self-consciousness and explicitness from the policy scholar” that comes with 
such a conscious classification of how policy is examined (Shlager, 2007, 294). The 
use of a framework therefore presents an opportunity to clarify and utilise the 
boundaries and scope of a particular work and comparatively examine a phenomena 
using competing theories and models. It exists to help generate the questions that need 
to be addressed in consideration of a particular issue or set of issues (Ostrom and 
Polski, 1999, 3). This evades the possibility of unqualified generalisation of theory or 
overextension of the explanatory capacity of a model (Shlager, 2007, 294). 
 
2.1.3 Frameworks and Improving Environmental Policy Evaluation 
A framework in this context facilitates the accumulation of knowledge, by 
introducing systematic analysis and rigour to reasoning in an openly comparative way. 
This also encourages less confusion in the interpretation of theories and discourages 
the practice ‘talking past’ opposing perspectives in debates (Schlager and Weible, 
2013, 390). This knowledge accumulation is a necessity for progress in policy 
development, implementation and desired outcomes. Further, frameworks can work to 
unite disparate disciplines, a particular necessity for the examination of environmental 
policy issues (Mickwitz, 2003, 416).  A framework can therefore offer a standardised 
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comparison of policies, with a common structure and ‘meta-theoretical language’ 
(Ostrom, 2007, 25). This comparative usage encourages a critical examination of the 
transparency and implications of assumptions in a theory or model, which is an 
element that was highlighted earlier as lacking in environmental policy evaluation. 
The contribution of a framework is therefore multifactorial, and goes beyond using 
frameworks for structural purposes only.  
2.2 A Framework for Environmental Policy Evaluation 
This section presents a set of criteria that will be used to judge the choice of 
framework most suited to this evaluative project. This comparative analysis will be 
applied selectively, with the spectrum of policy frameworks narrowed to the most 
suitable, namely the ACF and IAD framework. These will be discussed to determine 
their suitability for environmental policy evaluation. 
 
2.2.1 Selection Criteria for an Environmental Policy Evaluation Framework 
Choosing a suitable framework requires selectivity in determining the approaches that 
best align with the definition of framework taken by this thesis. The following 
questions therefore narrow the scope of analysis:  
 
1. How does this framework and its application define ‘framework’? 
 
2. Does the use of a framework encourage standardisation and contribute to 
knowledge building? 
 
3. How has this framework been applied previously? 
 
The framework-theory-model delineation is often ignored, and analytical frameworks 
commonly blend into highly specific theories, models or empirical evidence (Shlager 
and Weible, 2013, 391). Many frameworks are also designed for specific use in non-
environmental areas, such as development or social security policy (Cairney and 
Heikkila, 2014, 372). A number of conceptual frameworks have also been omitted 
from consideration due to their one-off usage. These frameworks are often vague, and 
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the framework is often solely for structural reasons. This neglects standardisation and 
comparison in evaluation, and limits the facilitation of knowledge building.  
 
The frameworks which best fulfil the above criteria are the ACF and IAD framework, 
the justification of which is threefold. First, these well-developed frameworks 
conform to the previously established definition of framework, having been applied 
many cases with the intention of contributing to the standardisation of policy analysis 
and cumulative knowledge building (Shlager, 2007, 294; Cairney and Heikkila, 2014, 
373-4). Second, the IAD and ACF are also the most commonly used in the analysis of 
environmental policy issues (Niles and Lubell, 2012, 41-42). Third, the historical 
development and application of both frameworks has been interdisciplinary (Polski 
and Ostrom, 1999, 3; Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier, 1994; Weible, et al., 2011, 349). 
 
Despite this, cases exist where ACF and IAD usage has been adapted and applied in a 
prescriptive fashion that mirrors the role previously advocated for theory. This may 
also encourage very specific forms of modelling. A difficulty of the key definitions 
described above will be maintaining the boundaries between framework, theory and 
model, and to avoid potential prescriptive tendencies. Without an awareness of this, 
the usefulness of the comparative nature of a framework is diluted.  
 
The following questions will therefore be used examine the ACF and IAD framework 
and determine their suitability for environmental policy evaluation:  
 
4. What are the main units of analysis?  
 
5. How does this framework understand policy? 
 
6. In what capacity does this framework engage with evaluation? 
 
7. Does this fulfil the needs of examining environmental policy evaluation? 
 
Policy theorists writing on the comparison of these frameworks have asked similar 
questions which fall into the categories of these broader questions (Cairney and 
Heikkila, 2014; Weible, 2014; Schlager, 2007). Question 4 considers the unique units 
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of analyses of each, covering the key concepts, actors and relationships. Question 5 
sees the understanding of the policy process in each framework as how issues are 
framed, including treatment of context, decision-making, ideas and beliefs, 
institutions and any assumptions. Question 6 assesses the potential evaluative capacity, 
and the flexibility of the framework to be amended for this aim. Question 7 examines 
the applicable scope, scale, how changes over time are characterised, and which 
theories and models are compatible (Bruyninckx, 2009, 31). Together, these 
considerations give an indication as to whether the requirements of environmental 
policy evaluation are fulfilled.  Each of these prescribed elements therefore 
contributes to the overall ‘fit’ of the framework, its suitability for engaging with 
environmental issues, and its evaluative capacity.   
 
2.2.2 The ACF and the IAD Framework: A Summary 
This section will briefly outline the two frameworks for comparison. The ACF uses 
‘policy sub-systems’, and was designed to specifically consider the nature of 
coalitions, policy learning and policy change (Cairney and Heikkila, 2014, 371). 
Drawing on more constructivist notions, it examines questions such as: “How do 
people mobilise, maintain and act in advocacy coalitions? What is the role of 
scientists and scientific information in policy making? What factors influence both 
minor and major policy change?” (Weible et al., 2011, 349).  
 
Alternatively, the IAD framework has a strong institutional foundation, and examines 
‘action situations’, a less prescriptive consideration with the possibility of a diversity 
of theories and models (Cairney and Heikkila, 2014, 371). The IAD framework 
examines institutions and organisations, and helps to simplify complex policy issues 
by providing possible questions to consider for systematic analysis. It asks questions 
such as: “Are they formal rules that are also used in practice, and are there informal 
rules that are at variance with the formal ones? Who are the people in these action 
situations? What are the attributes of the goods or services they are trying to produce 
or consume or distribute, or the resource they are trying to use or share?” (Blomquist 
and deLeon, 2011, 2-4). The figures 2.1 and 2.2 summarise the two frameworks in a 
diagrammatic sense.  
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Figure 2.1: The Advocacy Coalition Framework 
 
Source: Weible, et al., 2011, 352 
 
Figure 2.2: The Institutional Analysis and Development Framework 
 
Source: Ostrom, 2005, 15 
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2.2.3 Comparing the ACF and IAD Framework 
This section extracts the key differences between the ACF and IAD framework in 
relation to the criteria in section 2.2.1. The ACF has more specific assumptions that 
are explicitly discussed with reference to the policy subject, where the IAD 
framework has a broader scope, considering “questions related to how institutions (as 
rules) are crafted and how they affect human behavior” (Cairney and Heikkila, 2014, 
368). The ACF focuses on beliefs and their implication in political behaviour in 
contrast to the focus on institutions and rules in the IAD framework. In dealing with 
change over time, the ACF response to internal external shocks, through links to other 
subsystems. The IAD framework instead emphasises exogenous factors, with less 
focus on ideas or networks considered in ACF subsystems (Schlager, 2007, 309-310). 
 
Explicit evaluative applications are not common in either the ACF or IAD framework. 
The IAD framework has explicit ‘evaluative criteria’ built into the framework as a 
significant component in the policy process (as in Figure 2.2). Since its conception, a 
number of evaluative criteria have been raised by Ostrom or affiliated IAD authors, 
and this remains a key component of many applications of this framework. The ACF 
has typically been applied more descriptively, and is rarely concerned with evaluation 
in an explicit sense. On balance, the ACF is therefore less suited to facilitating a 
‘careful assessment’, as warranted by the definition of environmental policy 
evaluation discussed earlier.  
 
The preceding discussion has attempted to draw out the differences between the two 
approaches to determine suitability for this project. On this basis, the IAD framework 
was deemed a more suitable ‘fit’ for the following reasons. First, the broader scope of 
the IAD framework more easily allows for a comparison of theories and models. 
Second, the assumption of institutional influences is less prescriptive than the 
confines of coalitions within a policy subsystem. This better targets environmental 
policy, where changes over time have historically been incremental, and the 
complexity of the demands of different agents is only in part, examinable through a 
coalitions-based approach. Third, the ACF has a more limited capacity for evaluation. 
The subjectivist, belief systems-oriented nature of the ACF makes it more difficult to 
evaluate using a falsifiable hypothesis or empirical measurement, given its 
development as a rejection of instrumental rationality. The focus of the framework on 
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belief systems and policy learning is more suited to descriptively analysing why 
changes in belief structures happen, rather than providing reasoned justification or 
empirical explanation for their translation to policy, or why such a change may be 
appropriate (Schlager, 1995, 246).  
 
This is not to undermine the credibility of the ACF in other contexts, rather it is 
intended that this project contribute to the broader literature of competing policy 
perspectives:  
 
“Most importantly, the main point in comparing the ACF and the IAD 
framework is not to answer all the comparative questions, but to recognize that 
both frameworks represent different research programs marked by different 
research cultures, assumptions, scopes, and emphases on major concepts” 
(Weible et al., 2011, 358). 
 
These specific questions were chosen to test the criteria most suitable to 
environmental policy evaluation. The IAD framework was therefore selected on this 
contextually specific basis. 
2.3 The IAD Framework: Strengths and Limitations 
This section presents an in depth examination of the IAD framework selected in the 
previous section. First, the IAD framework will be explored in detail for use in the 
preliminary application in chapter 3. Second, limitations of the framework are 
explicitly explored, to avoid common pitfalls, and to ensure the use of the framework 
is self-reflexive and can withstand critical scrutiny. Providing perspectives on 
possible interpretations and critiques that may be relevant for the application aims to 
strengthen and further justify the selection of the IAD framework.  
 
2.3.1 The IAD Framework in Detail 
The IAD framework helps to systematically determine the questions to be asked in 
policy analysis, a central contribution to addressing the problems with current 
environmental policy evaluation. The IAD framework is therefore a broad system 
within which to apply theories and models, not a prescriptive or blueprint approach 
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(Korten, 1980 in Polski and Ostrom, 1999, 4-5). This allows for an analysis that 
brings a rigour to reasoning in public debate. This framework therefore “provides a 
means to synthesise the work of multiple participants, including those who are 
directly involved in the policy situation and have an interest in policy outcomes” 
(Polski and Ostrom, 1999, 6). 
 
Ostrom and her colleagues developed the IAD framework for comprehensive 
institutional analysis and development, and at its core is the acknowledgement of 
institutional forces (McGinnis, 2011, 171). The explanatory significance of 
institutions is often overlooked because of their abstract or invisible nature. Their 
analytical importance in policy is therefore reasserted in Ostrom’s definition of 
institutions as “human-constructed constraints or opportunities within which 
individual choices take place and which shape the consequences of their choices” 
(McGinnis, 2011, 170). This is explicitly acknowledged in the exogenous variables of 
the framework, thereby allowing for an account of path dependent characteristics and 
outcomes. This is central to the nature of change in an institutional context, which is 
“incremental and sequential … rather than totally reconstructive or destructive … 
Institutional change transforms the structures of incentives within future decisions are 
made” (Imperial and Yandle, 2005, 503).  
 
The reasoning for implementing the IAD framework is therefore twofold. First, as the 
end product of the work of disparate disciplines, it is convincing in its ability to 
address issues that are inescapably environmental, moral, economic and political. Its 
development stems from the need to systematically address ecological and 
institutional issues, and its design in this context makes it a suitable way to improve 
environmental policy analysis. Second, at the heart of the IAD framework is its ability 
to increase the transparency of assumptions in policy evaluation through the use of a 
framework for standardised comparison of policies, with common language and 
structure (Polski and Ostrom, 1999, 4-5). While the IAD framework has not always 
been applied with an evaluative component, its advantage as a systematic and 
interdisciplinary approach allow for broader notions of evaluation, and a broad range 
of theory and models in application.  
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2.3.2 Limitations of the IAD Framework   
Any framework, theory or model has limitations. Addressing or acknowledging the 
potential limitations is vital in ensuring an evaluation of environmental policy that can 
engage with complex theoretical and practical issues. The limited methodological 
diversity in previous applications is one possible limitation to consider. The IAD 
framework is more akin to certain methodologies and theories, particularly derivatives 
of mainstream economics. This is attributable to the framework’s use so far, where 
tools of mainstream economics are often used.  The understanding of individuals and 
agents also often resembles a methodological individualist approach to social 
processes. There is no prescriptive approach to characterising the individual in the 
framework, which means flawed mainstream assumptions on perfect rationality are 
compatible (Ostrom, Cox and Schlager, 2014 in Cairney and Heikkila, 2014, 380). 
While any theory necessarily simplifies phenomena using assumptions, engaging with 
the language and structure of the framework whilst avoiding reductionist conceptions 
will be challenging (McGinnis, 2011, 171).  
 
Those who were influenced by Ostrom and her colleagues tend to use game theoretic 
methods, or characterise individuals using Herbert Simon’s theory of ‘bounded 
rationality’ or ‘satisficing agents’, in contrast to traditional utility maximisation 
assumptions. Both game theory and the theory of Simon attempt to conceptualise 
agents in a way that better accords with the actions of agents in reality (Ostrom, 2011, 
14). However, approaches that do so are limited by their reliance on methodological 
individualism, as they are largely incapable of systematically theorising the social 
macrostructures of society.  
 
Simon was critical of the New Institutional Economics (NIE) discipline, and 
advocated his alternative approach of integrating social phenomena to augment the 
explanatory power of economics in opposition to NIE (Simon, 1991). According to 
Simon, NIE amendments to neoclassical theory “are typically introduced into the 
analysis in a casual way, with no empirical support except an appeal to introspection 
and common sense … giving it a very ad hoc flavour” (Simon, 1991, 27 [own 
emphasis]). However, Simon can be critiqued in the same way, as he uses a similarly 
‘ad hoc’ approach to the incorporation of social phenomena. NIE and rational choice 
approaches that centre on individual utility maximisation are limited by their 
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“inability to account for the way in which normative and causal ideas (and changes in 
those ideas) shape interests, frame choices and establish norms” (Bell and Hindmoor, 
2014, 475).   
 
Other critics highlight the oversimplified treatment of agents that results from 
individualist applications. Hayden suggests that the uniformity of agents as 
individuals, boundedly rational, or otherwise, was overstated in applications of the 
IAD framework, including Ostrom’s own application (Hayden, 2011, 468). This 
thesis will inevitably make simplifying assumptions about agents through 
classification. However, it will be acknowledged that size scope and the influence of 
agents matter: the operation of individual MP’s or Senators in the houses of 
Parliament is different to large employer associations or lobby groups at the collective 
choice level.  
 
Engaging with Ostrom’s levels of analysis therefore helps to diversify conceptions of 
agents and avoid the reductive characterisations of mainstream economics (Blomquist 
and deLeon, 2011, 4). The layering of different levels, each with interconnected 
action situations is dependent on the phenomena under examination, and this 
flexibility allows for the broader applicability of Ostrom’s framework. Multiple action 
situations within each analytical choice level exist, and each has agents, rules and 
other external factors that may be unique or shared. Ostrom separates these choice 
levels as follows: 
 
Figure 2.3: Levels of Analysis in the IAD Framework 
 
Source: Adapted from Ostrom, 2005, 62 
 
 
Constitutional CollectiveChoice Operational
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It is hoped that consciousness of this in applying the framework, and the utilisation of 
theory that promotes nuanced characterisations of agents will mitigate this problem. 
The criticisms raised here are therefore attributable to the overreliance on orthodox 
economic theories and methods, rather than the framework itself. This presents a 
compelling case for the utilisation of heterodox theories and methods. 
2.4 Post-Positivist Evaluation and the IAD Framework 
This section reconceptualises the rational choice notions of evaluation in the IAD 
framework, thus broadening the characterisation of evaluation. First, the synthesis of 
rationalistic and constructivist (or realist) concerns will be discussed in order to move 
beyond the rational choice tendencies of the IAD framework. Second, the relevance 
of explicitly evaluating normative concerns will be examined, broadening the 
analytical abilities of evaluation mechanisms, in keeping with the critiques of 
economic methods of evaluation discussed earlier. Third, these components will be 
integrated into the IAD framework.  
 
The IAD framework explicitly engages with evaluation through the ‘evaluative 
criteria’ component, the design of which stems from rational choice notions of 
evaluation. In order to facilitate and improve the translation of the IAD framework to 
an evaluative context, notions of post-positivist evaluation will be integrated.  In 
Ostrom’s ‘Understanding Institutional Diversity’, a book that presents a detailed 
vision of the IAD framework in over 350 pages, only 2 pages are dedicated to the 
‘evaluative criteria’ of the framework (Ostrom, 2005, 66-67).  
 
The use of mixed-methods in evaluation draws on post-positivist epistemology to 
characterise evaluation as an iterative process that is “principled, pragmatic and 
pluralistic” (Chelimsky, 2010, 16; Hanberger, 2001; Fischer, 1995, 227). This broader 
evaluation requires an account of the unintended consequences that are inevitable in 
environmental policy.  Examining impacts of an influence outside the prescribed 
system is a key strength of constructivist approaches like the ACF. Accounting for 
these unforseen elements acknowledges the “mechanisms that intervene between the 
delivery of program service, and the occurrence of outcomes of interest” (Weiss, 1997, 
73).  
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2.4.1 Synthesis: Balancing Rationalism and Constructivism 
Post-positivist policy theorists acknowledge the possibility of a synthesis of rationalist 
and constructivist approaches, implying a spectrum instead of a dichotomous relation 
between the two. Increasingly, evaluation is conducted in this theoretical ‘middle 
ground’, where contextually specific analysis helps to mitigate the pitfalls of the 
‘panacea problem’ (Huitema et al., 2011, 184-5; Ostrom and Cox, 2010, 2) 9. In this 
approach, the selected elements to include in evaluation must be justified by the 
context of the subject, a notion raised by Chelimsky:  
 
“Evaluation has always required consideration of the factors surrounding its 
subject matter. And because the methodological choices for an evaluation 
spring precisely from the careful analysis of these factors, evaluators need to 
recognize their relevance and integrate them into the blood and bones of the 
work in progress” (Chelimsky, 2010, 2). 
 
The unavoidable prioritisation of certain rationalist or constructivist elements is 
therefore a selective act that must be guided by the demands of environmental policy 
evaluation.  
 
For rationalist policy theorists, questions of instrumental significance are prioritised. 
This may involve testing hypotheses regarding the fulfilment of pre-defined goals 
(Pawson and Tilley 1997, 84-85). Alternatively, constructivist perspectives 
acknowledge the ‘autonomous character’ of policy, and may consider broader 
questions regarding the “nature of problems”, the “discourses and frames” used by 
actors, or policy “performance” (Huitema et al., 2011, 183). The IAD framework 
tends toward the rationalist approach, in contrast with the constructivist characteristics 
of the ACF. 
 
                                                   
9  “The  panacea  problem  occurs  whenever   a   single   presumed   solution   is   applied   to   a  wide   range  of  
problems.  This  problem  has  two  distinct  dimensions.  The  first  dimension  occurs  in  situations  where  a  
theory   is  too  precise  to  be  flexibly  adapted  to  the  range  of  cases  to  which   it   is  applied.  …  The  other  
dimension  of  the  panacea  problem  involves  theories  that  are  excessively  vague  instead  of  excessively  
precise”  (Ostrom  and  Cox,  2010,  2).  
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The development of the constructivist approach grew from criticisms of the rationalist 
emphasis on generalisation (Vedung, 2010, 268). Yet, critiquing the determinism of 
overgeneralisation does not imply the necessity of rejecting all forms of generalisation 
or ‘pure’ constructivism. Rather, the generalisation of approaches and concepts is 
distinct from the generalisation of results, and the conflation of these concepts 
perpetuates a rationalist-constructivist dichotomy (Mickwitz, 2006, 65). A pure 
rejection of causation is also not necessary to counteract the oversimplification of 
causation in certain rationalist theories and models. Instead, a cautious approach to 
how causation is described, modelled, or assumed may be sufficient to avoid the 
problematic conflation of correlation and causation.   
 
2.4.2 Normative Concerns 
The key criticisms explored in the first chapter of this thesis prompt a consideration of 
normative concerns in the evaluation process. This draws on constructivist rejections 
of definitive and objective truths in policy evaluation (Guba and Lincoln, 1989, 46). 
Rather, a middle ground possible through epistemological developments in the post-
positivist tradition. For example, the synthesis of empirical and normative evaluation 
is at the foundation of Fischer’s four tiered evaluation process, where public policy 
evaluation is broadened to include the evaluation of ideological commitments and 
social values (Fischer, 1995, 155).  These are summarised in the table below:  
 
Table 2.1: Fischer’s Levels of Evaluation  
Level of Evaluation Questions 
Technical verification Are the policy goals achieved? 
Situational validation Are the goals an adequate solution to the problem? 
System vindication Is the policy compatible with political values and accepted 
societal aims? 
Rational social choice Is a fundamental change of life and new social ideals 
necessary? 
Source: Fischer, 1995, 18 
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Recognising normative concerns in policy evaluation is a rejection of the neutral 
evaluator, and implies evaluation does not aim to extract unchallengeable objective 
truths (Vedung, 2010, 269; Chelimsky, 1997, 99). Acknowledging normativity in 
evaluation recognises the potential for interests or ideological motivations in the 
inherently political nature of actors in policy making. This is consistent with a 
pluralist methodology. Normative concerns may create potentially incommensurable 
perspectives, and pluralism embraces this by recognising the validity of this 
occurrence. Further, the necessary selectivity in a pluralist approach requires 
normative judgement to enact this selectivity. The IAD framework can therefore act 
as a mechanism to enact this pluralist approach and make selections explicit. 
Foundationally acknowledging the inherently political nature of environmental policy 
therefore improves the evaluative capacity of a framework. 
 
2.4.3 Expanding ‘evaluation’ in the IAD Framework  
The following integrates these post-positivist contributions to expand evaluation in 
the IAD framework. Changes to the framework can occur through two mechanisms: 
indirectly, through the way the framework is applied, or directly, through changes to 
the structure of the existing framework. In the former, indirect changes can occur 
through the pluralistic selection process of theories and methods. This is 
complemented by direct structural amendments to the framework itself.  This two-
tiered approach integrates evaluative concerns through both the application and 
design of the framework. Doing so avoids prescriptive design tendencies, and 
encourages the underlying notions of the framework to be explicitly challenged rather 
than implicitly assumed.  
 
First, evaluation in the IAD framework does not need to be limited to a set of 
evaluative criteria for outcomes and interactions only (Ostrom, 2005, 66). Rather, the 
IAD framework as a whole can be used as a systematic mechanism to determine the 
questions for conducting a holistic evaluation. A broader definition of evaluation 
considers more than outcomes, and reconceptualising the IAD framework as 
explicitly evaluative encourages conceptions of evaluation as a process. Examining 
how the exogenous variables change over time, or analysing the action situation is an 
evaluative act in and of itself. Adopting this requires no structural or diagrammatic 
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change. However, it represents a significant shift from existing applications of the 
framework. For example, the rules-in-use encompasses different levels that change 
over time in a dynamic political environment. These rules may also change over time 
as a result of the policy evaluation, so a feedback mechanism exists that is 
unaccounted for by evaluation as a separate input to interactions and outcomes only.  
 
Second, given the rational choice origins of the IAD framework, the integration of 
constructivist perspectives will strengthen its flexibility and applicability. 
Constructivists commonly critique the limited consideration of political power and its 
influence in the construction of policy in rationalist approaches. In the IAD 
framework, the axiomatic characterisation of rules-in-use may obscure nuanced 
considerations of power and social structures. Improvement is needed to account for 
the inherently political nature of policy development and the ‘historically-specific 
structures of power, rather than simply calculated pay-offs’ (Mosse, 2010 in Whaley 
and Weatherhead, 2014, 6). To rectify this, Clement proposes the inclusion of the 
‘political economic context’ (PE context) as an exogenous factor that influences the 
action situation (Clement, 2010, 129-131). This acknowledges the historical path 
dependency of policy development and contextualises agent interactions as contingent 
on the dynamic political context.  
 
Third, acknowledging constructivist and normative considerations can occur by 
incorporating the four-tiered approach of Fischer, which encourages broader 
evaluative criteria of the action situation interactions and outcomes (Fischer, 1995). 
Broadening notions of evaluation is achievable through a synthesis of Ostrom and 
Fischer’s approach depicted in the table below. An explicit engagement with 
normative concerns will be a key aspect of encouraging constructivist analysis, and 
acknowledging the inherent interests of agents in the action situation.  
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Table 2.2: Synthesising Fischer and Ostrom’s Evaluation Approach 
Fischer’s Public Policy 
Evaluation 
Ostrom’s 
Evaluative Criteria 
Synthesis 
Technical Verification 
Are the policy goals 
achieved? 
Efficiency 
 
Equity 
 
Fiscal Equivalence 
 
Accountability 
 
Adaptability 
 
Legitimacy 
 
Participation 
 
Moral Values 
Technical Verification: 
Efficiency 
Situational Validation 
Are the goals an adequate 
solution to the problem? 
Situational Validation: 
Equity 
Fiscal Equivalence  
System Vindication 
Is the policy compatible with 
political values and accepted 
societal aims? 
System Vindication and 
Social Choice: 
Accountability  
Adaptability 
Participation 
Legitimacy  
Moral Values 
Rational Social Choice 
Is a fundamental change of 
life and new social ideals 
necessary? 
Source: Fischer, 1995, 18; Ostrom, 2005, 66-67 
 
The “first-order” evaluative components, technical verification and situational 
verification, will be examined in the following chapter, as a form of provisional 
application of the approach outlined here. The “second-order” components examine 
policy in “the societal system as a whole”, asking questions concerning the systems 
and ideological discourses of society, and evaluates accordingly (Fischer, 1995, 21). 
Given the scope and analytical detail required to evaluate  “second order” systemic 
component, these will not be the primary concern of the application in Chapter 3.  
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2.5 Summary: From Design to Application 
This chapter has selected and developed an existing policy framework as a 
foundational mechanism for improving environmental policy evaluation. Existing 
literature on frameworks was explored to justify a framework as an alternative to 
economic evaluation approaches discussed in Chapter 1. Explicit selection criteria 
were discussed to select the IAD framework as a suitable mechanism for this project. 
The second half of this chapter built on the selected IAD framework. The framework 
was examined in depth, and potential limitations concerns were discussed. Post-
positivist evaluation theory was also explored to strengthen the evaluative capacity of 
the framework. This corresponds with the aims discussed earlier: to conduct 
evaluation from a holistic perspective that explicitly engages with the normative 
implications that manifest in theories, models, and their assumptions. The following 
chapter will pursue a preliminarily application of the amended framework developed 
here. 	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 52 
Chapter 3 
Testing the Framework: A Preliminary Application 
 
The existing RET is broken. Both the Opposition and the clean energy 
industry know this. Since the RET was introduced in its current form six 
years ago market conditions have changed and there is now an oversupply 
of electricity. The RET is now out of step with the energy and consumer 
market in which it operates…”  
 
- Hon. Greg Hunt MP, Minister for the Environment 
“Government Focussed On Repairing The RET” 
Joint media release with Hon. Ian Macfarlane MP,  
Minister For Industry And Science, 16 March 2015 
3. Introduction 
This chapter undertakes a preliminary application of the IAD framework discussed in 
chapter two, aiming to systematically analyse a complex environmental policy issue 
in an evaluative way. This preliminary application will examine the major 2015 
amendments to the RET legislation. It will evaluate the justification and the intended 
outcomes of the 2015 amendments, in relation to the objectives set out in the original 
policy legislation. The evaluation undertaken in this chapter will investigate the 
legitimacy of the Federal Government’s justification for the 2015 RET amendments, 
as described in the above quote. The term preliminary is used to highlight the 
intention of the application: to selectively apply the framework and provide examples 
to demonstrate its use in further research, rather than offering a completed analysis of 
the RET or the Australian RE sector. This application therefore explores the 
capabilities of the framework when applied to a recent policy issue. This tests the 
strengths of this approach highlighted in Chapters 1 and 2, particularly its facilitation 
of evaluation through knowledge building, and its ability to explicitly engage with the 
interests of agents in the policy process.   
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3.1 Australia’s Renewable Energy Target  
The RET is a commitment by the Federal Government aimed at encouraging 
renewable energy sources for electricity and reducing Australia’s greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions from electricity generation. Stemming from the previous 
incarnation known as the Mandatory Renewable Energy Target (MRET) in 2001, 
legislation for the current expanded RET was implemented in 2010 and contains 
mandatory targets that guarantee that 20% of the total amount of power is generated 
from renewable sources by 2020. This target was mandated in 2010 as a fixed figure 
of 41,000 Gigawatt hours (GWh) based on projected energy usage from 2010 
forecasts. With recent electricity consumption falling below the 2010 projected 
increases, the target of 41,000 GWh would have been equal to approximately 27% of 
total electricity production in 2020 (Warburton Review, 2014, 15-16). This projected 
minimum generation change from 20% to 27% of total electricity became the primary 
catalyst for a major reassessment of the 41,000 GWh target by the Federal 
Government. 
 
 
3.1.1 the 2010 RET Objectives 
The objectives are outlined in the Commonwealth Renewable Energy (Electricity) 
Act (REE Act, 2000) as follows:  
 
“The objects of this Act are:  
(a) to encourage the additional generation of electricity from renewable sources; 
(b) to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases in the electricity sector; and  
(c) to ensure that renewable energy sources are ecologically sustainable” (REE 
Act, 2000, 1). 
 
3.1.2 RET Reviews 
A number of reviews of the RET (or MRET) have been commissioned by the 
government, such as the 2003 Tambling Review, the Climate Change Authority 
(CCA) reviews in 2012 and 2014 and the 2014 Warburton Review. Given the 
legislated requirement for review of the RET every two years, the Federal government, 
assembled an independent Expert Panel to conduct the 2014 RET Review (hereafter 
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the Warburton Review). The review included government commissioned modelling, 
public consultation through submissions from any interested parties, and culminated 
in a report to be presented the Federal Government in August 2014.  
 
3.1.3 The 2015 Amendments to the REE Act10 
Following the release of the Warburton Review, the Federal Government undertook 
extensive negotiations to alter the legislation dealing with the RET. The agreed 
changes were passed through both houses of parliament in June 2015. This evaluation 
will focus on the following two key amendments:   
 
1. “reduce the large-scale renewable energy target (LRET) from 41,000 gigawatt-
hours (GWh) by 2020 to 33,300 GWh with this level to be maintained until 2030.” 
 
The LRET is the RET component which legislates the minimum generation from RE 
sources. This is in contrast to the uncapped small-scale renewable energy scheme, 
(SRES), which is an uncapped mechanism to encourage household or small-scale 
commercial RE generation. RET. The 33,000GWh figure was a bipartisan 
compromise negotiated over a number of months, and was justified by the 2015 
revised projections of electricity market conditions (Hunt and Macfarlane, 2015)11.  
 
2. “allow full exemptions to be provided for electricity used in prescribed emissions-
intensive trade-exposed (EITE) activities, so that they do not need to purchase and 
surrender large-scale generation certificates”. 
 
This represents a significant change in the legislation, as EITE firms now allocated a 
number of exemption certificates that offsets the equivalent of 100% of the RET 
impacts. Previously, firms defined as “highly emission-intensive” were exempt at 
what was approximately a 90% rate, and “moderately emission-intensive” firms were 
                                                   
10  Note   that   these   are   two   of   the   four   amendments   that   were   enacted   in   2015.   Two   additional  
amendments   regarding   review   procedure   and   the   re-­‐inclusion   of   native   forest   biomass   were   also  
included,   however   the   implications   of   these   amendments   will   not   be   examined   in   the   following  
evaluation.  
  
11  See  Appendix  1  for  a  yearly  comparison  table  of  the  2010  target  and  2015  amended  yearly  targets.  
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exempt at a 60% rate. The new 100% exemption now applies to both highly and 
moderately emission-intensive EITE businesses.  
 
3.1.4 Real-time Evaluation: Linking Intended Outcomes and Policy Objectives  
The evaluation conducted by applying the IAD framework is a practical example of 
the ex nunc or ‘real-time’ policy evaluation, which contributes to knowledge building 
as a component of the ongoing process of evaluation. Real-time evaluation can 
improve on current evaluation approaches by highlighting potential problems or 
discrepancies more immediately. The IAD framework is applicable at different stages 
of the policy process, and an evaluation of the intended outcomes of changes 
contributes to knowledge building at a time when evaluation of outcomes is not yet 
possible. Given the amendments were only implemented in 2015, appropriate 
empirical evidence of the impacts is not yet established. The information used in this 
preliminary application therefore draws from the Reviews conducted in 2014. The re-
examination of these sources, and their contributions to the 2015 amendments 
highlights the versatility of the IAD framework in new contexts, and the ability of the 
framework to engage with the interests of policy agents in a way that was not wholly 
captured by the Warburton Review. Each of the sections of the IAD framework 
examined will conclude by highlighting the findings of the IAD framework in this 
preliminary application.  
 
3.2 External Factors 
The IAD framework includes assessments of external (or exogenous) factors, which 
are key components in breaking down complex policy scenarios. The biophysical 
conditions: community attributes, rules-in-use, and political-economic context, 
highlight factors that influence or constrain the institutional arrangement of the action 
arena. The action situation is therefore the dependent variable that is potentially a 
consequence of these given underlying and independent factors (Ostrom, 2005, 13-
15). These factors may be determined as a result of separate action situations, 
particularly where inter-related policies or programs promote multi-factorial 
contributions to certain outcomes. In application, this considers the subject in a 
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constructed isolated way, whilst still acknowledging the existence of many other 
policies that directly or indirectly impact upon the subject of analysis.  
 
3.2.1 Biophysical and Material Conditions 
The unique Australian biophysical conditions have shaped the culture and the 
economic prospects of Australia. Australia’s long history with, and reliance on, 
energy intensive industry has shaped the common narratives of Australia’s prosperity 
(Crough and Wheelwright, 1983, 17). As a result, these industries have a significant 
path dependent political economic stronghold. For example, the recent mining boom 
continued the above trend levels of growth in Australia, and simultaneously 
entrenched the position of these global mining interests in the heart of the federal 
political system (Battelino, 2010 in Bell and Hindmoor, 2014, 471). While the 
utilisation of natural resources was contingent many factors, such as the global 
economic conditions, or the unprecedented growth of nearby countries, it would not 
have been possible without the natural stock of resources itself.  
 
The geographic specificity of resources therefore influences policy. One example is 
the state-based concentration of natural assets. States such as Western Australia and 
Queensland contain the predominant stock of non-RE resources, namely coal and gas, 
and were the primary recipients of investment during the mining boom (Marsh, Lewis 
and Chesters, 2014, 715). Similarly, certain states have better natural conditions for 
the establishment of RE of fossil fuel generation facilities, as demonstrated in the 
generation of RE and fossil fuels in different Australian states Table 3.1. The 
importance of biophysical conditions is therefore twofold: it both shapes the outcomes 
themselves, and also shapes the other exogenous variables considered in the 
framework, such as institutions or political economic context.   
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Table 3.1: Renewable Energy and Fossil Fuel Generation by state, 2014  
State 
Total 
Generation 
(GWh) 
Fossil Fuel 
Generation 
(GWh) 
Renewable 
Generation 
(GWh) 
Penetration of 
Renewables 
(%) 
SA  11,933   7,115   4,817  40% 
WA  18,425   16,082   2,343  13% 
VIC  53,203   48,037   5,166  10% 
TAS  11,004   584   10,420  95% 
NSW  60,594   57,226   3,368  6% 
QLD  57,683   53,797   3,885  7% 
Source: Adapted from Clean Energy Australia Report, Clean Energy Council, 2014, 9 
 
3.2.2 Community Attributes 
The community attributes encompasses the culture and attitudes of the community 
affected in the action arena (Ostrom, 2005, 26). At a national level, the concern of 
households and firms regarding electricity prices was a primary issue in RE policy 
debate. This was a main concern of the Warburton Review and modelling, as well as 
dwarfing public discourse on the carbon tax/emissions trading scheme (ETS) 
legislation through the Labor Government’s time in office (Saddler, 2013, 6; 
Commonwealth of Australia, 2014, 1) For example, on the issue of energy sources, 
84% of respondents placed solar energy in their top three, where only 13% ranked 
coal. Over 70% of Australians support a commitment to 20% of energy sourced from 
RE by 2020 (Climate Institute, 2014, 4). The following table highlights the results of 
respondents when ranking their top 3 preferred energy sources for Australia.  
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Table 3.2: Survey Respondents’ Preferred Australian Energy Sources 
Energy Source Respondents  
(%) 
Solar 84% 
Wind 69% 
Hydro (Dams) 47% 
Tidal/Wave 30% 
Geothermal 24% 
Gas 21% 
Nuclear 13% 
Coal 13% 
 
Source: Climate of the Nation, Australian Climate Institute Publication, 2015  
 
3.2.3 Rules-in-use 
Rules-in-use, are referred to by Ostrom and colleagues as “shared understandings by 
participants about enforced prescriptions concerning what actions (or outcomes) are 
required, prohibited, or permitted (Ganz, 1971; V. Ostrom 1980; Commons, 1968 in 
Ostrom, 2005, 18 [emphasis from text]). Determining which of these rules is relevant, 
given they could be formally stated or more implicit institutionally based ‘working’ 
rules, is done so “according to their direct impact on the working parts of the action 
situation” (Ostrom, 2005, 20-21). One such example of these formal rules is 
demonstrated in Figure 3.1 below, which highlights a number of possible legislations 
a RE project may be affected by (Martin and Rice, 2015, 129). Conceptualising the 
relevant formal rules-in-use for evaluation in this context considers how these rules 
were dismantled, appropriated, or undermined. The introduction of the ‘expert panel’ 
for the 2014 Review despite the legislated role for the CCA Review is an example of 
this process (CCA Legislation Amendment, 2015; RET Amendment Bill, 2015). In 
this case, the circumvention of formal rules through informal processes reflects the 
Coalition Government position on RE policy.  
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Figure 3.1: RE-related policies, Legislation and Regulations in Australia 
Source: Martin and Rice, 2015, 129 
 
3.2.4 Political-Economic Context 
This external factor is an addition, as discussed in earlier [section number], has a 
major significance for the 2015 amendments. For example, a major catalyst for the 
alterations to the RET legislation was the change of government in September 2013. 
The current Coalition Government campaigned for, or made election promises on the 
abolition of the carbon tax, the CCA, ARENA, and the CEFC (Hannam, 2014; Abbott, 
2014; CCA Repeal Bill, 2013). The governments RE policy stance was elucidated in 
the 2015 Energy White Paper, 2015. This implies Australia’s continuing reliance on 
fossil fuels, with innovations limited to productivity and competitiveness measures. 
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The term ‘climate change’ is used only once (Energy White Paper, 2015). However, 
these earlier attempts to reduce the RET were blocked or amended in various deals by 
the senate crossbench (Hannam, 2014). These 18 senators therefore hold considerable 
influence over Australia’s RE policy, and are a major contributor to action situation 
outcomes. 
 
Further, the biggest catalyst for the RET legislative changes was the unprecedented 
fall in Australia’s electricity demand, which peaked in 2010 (Warburton Review, 
2014, 15; Saddler, 2013, 4). The contributors to this change in electricity demand 
include the increased energy efficiency programs (primarily regulatory standards and 
restrictions), a refocus away from electricity-intensive industries in the Australian 
economy, and the elasticity of demand in household electricity consumption (Saddler, 
2013, 5). Coupled with a significant concern among consumers about further 
increasing electricity prices, the possibility of the RET causing over-generation or 
excessive capacity was a primary motivation for the Federal Government (Hunt and 
Macfarlane, 2015). This also coincided with the extensive debate regarding the carbon 
tax, further increasing consumer consciousness of electricity expenditure (Saddler, 
2013, 6).  
 
3.2.5 External Factors: Findings from the IAD Application  
The use of the IAD framework in establishing these external factors highlights the 
relevant variables to consider for the influences on the action situation. External 
factors account for unforseen events or policy consequences that influence the action 
situation, such as the unprecedented fall in electricity consumption in Australia. This 
provides broader explanatory significance for evaluation by systematically 
investigating the relevant factors that contextualise policy. The consideration of 
external factors in evaluation encourages a holistic engagement with complex policy 
phenomena, whilst still providing focus for those that directly impact the action 
situation. 
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3.3 Situating the Action: Ostrom’s Action Situation 
The IAD framework also promotes assessment of the layering of different levels, each 
with interconnected action situations is dependent on the phenomena under 
examination, and this flexibility allows for the broader applicability of Ostrom’s 
framework. In the 2015 RET amendments the primary action situation takes place at 
the ‘constitutional’ level as the pivotal decision-making takes place in Federal 
Parliament. Yet, the influence of other action situations and different levels of 
analysis, containing different (or overlapping) agents must be considered to 
contextualise the decision making processes of these parliamentary agents. For 
example, the decisions of government as connected to the interest groups and 
lobbyists with whom the agents of government consult. These agents at the ‘collective 
choice’ level are therefore considered in the evaluation of outcomes at the 
constitutional level.  
 
However, Ostrom’s characterisation of the levels of analysis of the framework is not 
only a ‘downstream’ relation, as represented in Figure 2.3 discussed in section 2.3.2. 
The flow of influence and relationships occurs in the opposite direction through more 
indirect, non-legislative channels (Blomquist and deLeon, 2011, 4). Formal regulatory 
requirements imposed by legislation do have downstream impact on the collective 
choice and operational level. However, the reverse flow of less explicit, institutional 
dynamics is also relevant, particularly in environmental issues. This is demonstrated 
in Figure 3.2.  
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Figure 3.2: Characterising the Action Situation for the RET Amendments 
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3.3.1 Actors  
The following highlights some of the key actors (or agents) involved in the action 
situation, and the relevant related action situations. Each of these agents has specific 
interests in the policy process, and possible coalition of interests has been highlighted 
at the constitutional choice level in Figure 3.2, using colours to represent potential 
interest alignments: green - likely RE aligned, black – likely non-RE aligned, red – 
government institutions and agencies. Note that these categories simplify the 
characterisation of certain agents. For example, at the operational level, the increased 
uptake of solar photovoltaic generation (PV) among households and small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SME’s) alters the kinds of agents involved in the 
production, distribution and consumption of electricity in Australia.  
 
Table 3.3: Examples of Agents in the Action Situation 
Agent Type Example 
RE Lobby Group Clean Energy Council 
Environmental Groups Greenpeace, WWF 
Non-RE Lobby Groups Minerals Council of Australia 
Non-Energy Think Tanks/Lobby Groups Business Council of Australia 
Federal Government* Divisible into a number agents which may be in 
potential conflict *See Figure 3.2. 
State and Territory Governments NSW, QLD, VIC 
Energy Market Operators/Regulators Australian Energy Market Operator, Clean 
Energy Regulator (CER), Australian Energy 
Regulator (AER) 
Government Funding Organisations Clean Energy Finance Corporation (CEFC), 
Australian Renewable Energy Agency (ARENA) 
RE Sector Investment  Southern Cross Venture Partners Pty Ltd Fund; 
Softbank China Venture Capital  
Non-RE Investment Groups Standard superannuation funds, equity firms 
Australian Ethical Investment; Australian Banks 
(eg. NAB Climate Bond, ANZ Green Bond) 
Government Research Organisations CSIRO 
Non-government Research Organisations Universities; private companies 
Electricity Retailers Representation by the Energy Retailers of 
Association of Australia: for firms such as AGL, 
Energy Australia, Origin Energy, Aurora Energy 
Electricity Consumers Households, SME’s, Industry 
Electricity Distribution and Network 
Providers 
Ausgrid, Endeavour Energy (NSW examples) 
Electricity Producers RE and Non-RE producers themselves, for 
domestic consumption or export, represented by 
peak bodies  
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Figure 3.3: the Federal Government in the Action Situation: an Example 
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indispensable” (Lindblom, 1977, 175). This may be through official roles in advisory 
boards, committees or other consultation positions, which have increased since the 
1950’s in Australia (Mathews 1976, in Warhurst, 2010, 339).  
 
This suggests that businesses in the energy industry have significant influence over 
the decision making of government. The long-standing role of emissions-intensive 
industry in the Australian economy, and the strong tradition of business-government 
relations can be seen to highlight the structural and institutional power of mining, 
resource and fossil fuel intensive industries (Crough and Wheelwright, 1983, 23-25). 
The formulation of Energy White Paper’s in previous years contained consultations 
with exclusively fossil fuel business interests, with no RE stakeholders included in 
these consultations under either the Howard or Rudd/Gillard Governments 
(Diesendorf, 2012, 46,53). This too can be seen in the Warburton Review, where the 
‘expert panel’ was primarily composed of business representatives. This was most 
obvious in the appointment of Dick Warburton to lead the Review, as an ex-chairman 
of fossil fuel company Caltex Australia. He has also publically expressed his 
scepticism in the scientific findings related to anthropocentric climate change 
(Harrison, 2014).  
 
However, this power does not stem exclusively from a firm’s structural position of 
power. Bell emphasises the notion of agency of both government and business agents, 
highlighting that they are constrained by ideas, and are threatened by the perception 
of outcomes or changes (Bell, 2012, 662; Marsh et al., 2014, 714). The power of these 
agents in this scenario therefore may not be explicit. The role of business 
organisations, whether in a lobbying or a more explicitly integrated role is therefore 
one of both economic and political power (Bell, 1995, 29-30). The less explicit links 
between the demands of business and government decision-making are also evident in 
the RET Amendments. The power of ideas, and the perceived threat of ‘green’ groups 
becomes another mechanism by which non-RE interest groups dominated 
consultations. Animosity between conservative ideological traditions and ‘green’ 
interests may have encouraged the preference more traditional fossil-fuel intensive 
industry in the conservative agenda of the Abbott Government.  
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3.3.3 The Action Situation: Findings from the IAD Application 
The analysis of the action situation highlights the institutional factors entirely 
unrecognised in mainstream evaluative techniques.  It is able to explore the relations 
between agents through and within different levels of analysis, and how these 
influence the action situation relevant for evaluation of the amendments, namely the 
Federal Parliament, characterised here as the ‘constitutional level’ in IAD terms. 
Different agents can be characterised as complex multi-level organisations or 
individual agents, and this emphasises the actions of agents in Parliament as 
contingent on the operation of other arms of the Federal Government.  
 
The link between the external factors and the impacts on the action situation 
facilitates the incorporation of the interests of agents, and provides explanatory 
significance of evaluating environmental policy. For example, the importance of the 
formal and informal rules that give the crossbench senators significant power in the 
action situation is one such relation. Further, the alignment of different state 
governments with the interests of different industry is linked through the biophysical 
conditions. The divergent review submissions of state governments in the Warburton 
Review can be explained by the differing concentrations of RE and fossil fuel 
industries (Warburton Review, 2014). The recommendations of state governments in 
review consultations was contingent on the industry influence in that state area, an 
outcome which was highlighted by applying theories of business power in the context 
of the action situation. The IAD framework therefore allows for systematic 
engagement with the interests of agents.  
 
3.4 Technical Verification: Efficacy and Cost-Effectiveness 
The outcome-based evaluative criteria discussed earlier in section 2.4.3 are used in a 
way that incorporates Fischer’s public policy schema to draw evaluative conclusions 
about the intended outcomes of the 2015 RET Amendments. As discussed earlier, 
Ostrom’s evaluative criteria are grouped into Fischer’s two sections: first order 
evaluation as technical verification and situational validation, and second-order 
evaluation as systems-based vindication and social choice. The remainder of this 
chapter will examine the first-order evaluation considerations in this exploratory 
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application.  The possibilities for second-order evaluation in further research will be 
discussed in the following concluding chapter.  
 
In this context, technical verification compares how the policy has performed in 
comparison to the initial objectives, considering efficiency and cost-effectiveness of 
the policy. As discussed in section 1.1, economic use of the term efficiency is highly 
problematic, as its use normatively implies it is both a primary authority of policy and 
that this stems from “scientific objectivity” (Bromley, 1989, 87). This section will 
therefore evaluate a form of ‘efficiency’ as efficacy and cost-effectiveness against the 
original objectives, to examine the justification for the 2015 amendments. 
 
3.4.1 Encouraging RE Electricity Generation 
The Warburton Review highlights several points that indicate the efficacy of the RET 
in encouraging renewable electricity generation: 
 
For the LRET, “capacity has grown by around 5,100 MW [since 2001] to 
13,100 MW in July 2014. 2,400 MW of this capacity has been added since the 
RET scheme was expanded in 2010”.  
 
For the SRES, “over 2 million small-scale renewable energy systems have been 
installed under the RET (CER, 2014)” (Warburton Review, 2014, 6-7). 
 
The Warburton Review conclusion of the RET performance was reiterated in the 
submissions of interested parties, such that “most submissions acknowledged that the 
RET has delivered on the objective of encouraging the additional generation of 
renewable electricity” (Warburton Review, 2014, 10). The contribution of RE to total 
electricity generation is depicted in Figure 3.4, with the increase in 2010-11 
corresponding with the implementation of the RET, and other targeted energy 
efficiency and environmental policies.  
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Figure 3.4: RE electricity generation as % of total electricity generation  
 
Source: CCA Review, 2014, 12  
 
3.4.2 Emissions Abatement 
The Warburton Review and many submissions noted the contribution of the RET in 
emissions reduction. As a result of the RET, abatement was estimated by SKM to be 
around 20Mt between 2001 and 2012 (Warburton Review, 2014, 11). Using similar 
methodology, ACIL estimated the cumulative impact of an LRET repeal compared to 
the pre-amendment case, summarised in the following table: 
 
Table 3.4: Cumulative Abatement for Pre-amendment LRET   
Time Period Cumulative emission abatement  (Mt CO2-e) 
2001-2012 20 
2015-2020* 58 
2015-2030* 299 
2015-2040* 520 
Source: SKM, 2012, in Warburton Review, 2014, 60; * cumulative forecast 
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Australia’s electricity generation has the highest GHG intensity of the OECD 
(Buckman, 2010, 74). This is a recent phenomenon, attributable to Australia’s 
“dependence on coal and its relatively modest use of RE electricity” (Buckman, 2010, 
75). Australia’s dependence on coal in electricity generation is demonstrated in Figure 
3.5. This presents the imperative for policy directed specifically at Australia’s 
electricity sector for Australia’s long-term emissions abatement project, domestic 
energy security agenda and international emissions obligations. This was reiterated in 
the 2014 CCA Review as an ongoing justification for the retention of the full RET 
target (CCA Review, 2014).  
 
Figure 3.5: Fuel Mix in Electricity Generation, 2010 
 
                          
Source: Australian Energy Resource Assessment, 2014, 12, data from: IEA, 2012  
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This is demonstrated in Figure 3.6, where reductions in CO2 emissions in the 
electricity sector significantly decline in the transition from the MRET to the full 
scale RET (both SRES and LRET). Note that emissions reductions are also 
attributable to the interaction with a number of other abatement and energy efficiency 
policies. The cumulative contribution of 20Mt over the period 2001-2012 therefore 
represents less than 10% of any given year at peak emissions, considered a “modest 
level of abatement” (Warburton Review, 2014, 11; CCA Review, 2014, 159). The 
impacts of the pre-amendment RET on electricity sector emissions intensity, which 
factors in electricity consumption (as MWh sent out), can be seen in Figure 3.7.  
 
Figure 3.6: Electricity Sector CO2 Emissions by State, 2000-2013 
  
Source: Warburton Review 2014, 12, data from Department of the Environment 
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Figure 3.7: Projected Electricity Sector Emissions Intensity 
 
Source: ACIL Allen, 2014, 31 
 
3.4.3 Cost-effectiveness 
Economic policy recommendations imply either fixing a price on emissions, or fixing 
a quantity of pollution (GHG emissions) as the most cost-effective approach 
(Keohane and Olmstead, 2007, 151-153, 180). However, this economic theory relies 
upon optimality notions that have major real world limitations. Previous reviews have 
highlighted these limitations, citing real world complications and accountability 
issues, and the deficiency of a unilateral policy approach (CCA, 2012). The concept 
of ‘optimal solutions’ to problematising emissions abatement will be rejected (in 
contrast to other RE research, such as Muis et al, 2010; Moriarty and Honnery, 2011).  
 
The reduction in the fixed figure target was argued for, in part, on the grounds of the 
lack of cost effectiveness compared to other abatement strategies (Hunt & Macfarlane, 
2015). The ACIL modelling estimates the total ‘resource cost’ of the pre-amendment 
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RET12 to be around $10bn to 2030 in net present value (NPV) 2014 dollars (ACIL, 
2014, 116). A 2011 PC report comparing international policies concluded that 
renewable energy schemes such as the LRET were the second most cost-effective 
policies for emissions reduction in electricity supply, after an emissions trading 
scheme. It also found that policies such as Australia’s RET that set a target for 
quantity of RE generation were more cost-effective than price based mechanisms 
(Productivity Commission, 2011, 80; CCA Review, 2014, 21).  
 
Further, cost-effectiveness measures of the RET in marginal emissions abatement cost 
vary significantly. The range of estimates of marginal emissions abatement costs are 
contingent on many future uncertainties, and rely on the foundational assumptions 
made about unknown phenomena inherent to environmental policy. The table in 
Appendix 2 highlights some of the different estimates about the cost of reductions to 
Australia’s GHG emissions. These estimates highlight how varying assumptions can 
alter the outcomes of modelling, as discussed earlier in section 1.4. A single figure or 
range is therefore limited in providing robust answers to cost-effectiveness concerns. 
Further, the assumption of discounting in abatement cost calculations (such as in the 
Warburton Review) is disputed, as argued in section 1.3. The CCA argue that unlike 
holding money over time, one tonne of emissions abatement is equally valuable to the 
overall task of reducing global emissions independent of the time scale (CCA Review, 
2014, 14). 
 
3.4.4 Technical Verification: Findings from the IAD Application 
The use of the IAD framework facilitates the evaluation of the intended outcomes of 
the amendments against the objectives stated in the original legislation. Where current 
approaches often take efficiency as the absolute criterion for policy evaluation, the 
IAD framework presents a contextualised multi-criteria evaluation that corresponds 
with broader notions of evaluation in an improved way. Breaking down notions of 
efficiency to efficacy and cost-effectiveness facilitates an evaluation that diverges 
                                                   
12  “The   cost   of   the   RET   is   commonly   measured   by   its   incremental   resource   cost   to   the   electricity  
sector   …   the   difference   between   the   net   present   value   (NPV)   of   the   resources   allocated   to   the  
electricity   sector   with   or   without   the   RET”.   The   incremental   resource   costs   include   the   costs   of  
building   and   running   a   renewable  plant,  minus   the   avoided   fuel   costs   of   displaced   fossil   fuel   plant,  
other  avoided  running  costs,  and  any  avoided  capital  costs”  (CCA  Review,  2014,  13).  
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from the current reductionist CBA techniques. While costs and benefits can be 
calculated to an extent, they are not necessarily commensurable, and equating these 
on a purely monetary basis may have ethical implications. The acknowledgement of 
this through the IAD framework application therefore improves environmental policy 
evaluation.  
 
A rejection of unilateral cost effectiveness also broadens the policy options, as policy 
evaluation no longer concerns the search for the optimal policy, but a comparison of 
multiple alternatives using mixed-methods through a post-positivist evaluative basis. 
The evaluation of these decisions therefore requires consideration of broader 
components, namely, the distribution of these costs, and resulting equity concern, 
which are inseparable components in the process of policy examination (Vatn, 2002, 
149). In the framework, elements of technical verification must be balanced with 
situational validation, which together comprise first-order evaluation. 
 
3.5 – Situational Validation: Fiscal Equivalence and Equity  
Under the RET legislation, the ‘liable entities’ are primarily energy retaillers, and a 
small number of large firms who directly source energy from electricity generators 
(REE Act, 2000). However, as indirect costs, these can be passed onto to consumers, 
as demonstrated in Figure 3.8, where the dark blue segment represents the 4% 
increase in electricity costs in the financial year (FY) 2013-14. As raised by both 
Fischer and Ostrom, consideration of how this impacts upon different agents in the 
action situation is key for evaluation, and will be a primary determinant of the 
interests of agents in the action situation. 
 
3.5.1 Contextualising Costs and Fiscal Equivalence 
The IAD framework highlights the necessity of examining costs in the context of the 
agents who bear the imposition of these costs through the concept of fiscal 
equivalence. Both the Warburton and CCA Reviews acknowledge the asymmetric 
distribution of the ‘resource costs’ that result from the RET, estimated by ACIL to be 
around $10 billion NPV. The impact on electricity producers is demonstrated in 
Figure 3.8, where the costs of the pre-amendment RET scenario compared to the 
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abolition scenario is determined from the ACIL modelling. The burden of resource 
costs is weighted toward fossil fuel generators, in particular, coal-powered generation. 
This is an expected outcome, given Australia’s reliance on fossil fuel generation and 
corresponding emissions intensity in electricity generation discussed earlier.  
 
In the IAD framework, fiscal equivalence is described as “the extent to which the 
beneficiaries of a public good or service are expected to contribute toward its 
production” (McGinnis, 2011, 176). In the context of CO2 production, normatively 
embracing the ‘polluter pays’ principle as an arbiter of fiscal equivalence, it can be 
argued that the polluters (beneficiaries) of clean air (a public good) are expected to 
contribute towards maintaining clean air. The justification of the amendment to 
reduce the target based on unnecessary costs is therefore in violation of the ‘polluter 
pays’ principle, a relatively weak normative concept from orthodox economic 
traditions. The reduction in the target therefore represents a redistribution of costs 
away from fossil fuel generators at the expense of RE generators, a notion that is at 
odds with the first legislated objective of encouraging RE generation13. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
13 The  2014  CCA  Review  further  justifies  the  imposition  of  the  RET  costs  for  fossil  fuel  generators  on  
two  grounds.  First,  the  acquisition  of  many  large  fossil   fuel  generation  plants  (55%  of  total  capacity)  
occurred   after   the   announcement   of   the   full   41,000   GWh   RET   or   equivalent   state   based   schemes,  
implying  this  cost  was  factored  into  investment  in  fossil  fuel  generation.  Second,  $2  billion  assistance  
provided  to  the  top  emissions  intensive  coal-­‐fired  generators  were  not  recouped  upon  the  repeal  of  
the  carbon  tax,  despite  its  purpose  to  offset  costs  of  the  measure  (CCA  Review,  2014,  22-­‐23).  
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Figure 3.8: Estimates of NPV Generator Revenue Pre-amendment vs Abolition  
 
 
Source: Warburton Review, 2014, 38 
 
Further, many costs were unaccounted for in the modelling submissions for the 
various reviews of the RET. For example, the Australian Academy of Technological 
Sciences and Engineering (ATSE) estimates the economically quantifiable 
externalities of fossil fuel generated electricity range from between A$42-$52 per 
MWh while the costs of solar PV energy were estimated at $5 per MWh and wind 
power only $1.5 per MWh (ATSE, 2009, ii). Despite justifying the RET and climate 
change policies through the concept of externalities as a cost to be internalised by the 
producer, these costs are not considered in any modelling submissions of the RET. 
Furthermore, submissions by parties included in the Warburton Review, such as the 
Institute of Public Affairs (IPA) Australia, are critical of the cross-subsidy to RE 
generators, without accounting for any of the subsidies paid to fossil fuel generators. 
The calculation of these also ranges significantly, and is contingent on the 
methodology used to calculate direct and indirect subsidisation. Examples are 
summarised in Appendix 3.  
 
The inclusion of these costs may have significant implications for the determination 
of cost and policy outcomes, and the agents who may bear the cost burden.  The 
estimated $10 billion NPV does not factor in any of these external costs. This 
emphasises that not only does the lower 2015 target not fulfill basic distributional 
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concerns of the polluter pays principle, but that the assumption of outdated 
considerations of economic costs has failed to incorporate the economic and 
environmental costs of continued coal production and CO2 emissions. The 
perpetuation of these outdated ideas can be attributed to the alignment of these ideas 
with the interests of agents in the action situation, namely fossil fuel based generators.   
 
3.5.2 Impact on Households: Electricity Prices and LRET 
The impact on household electricity prices was a major imperative for the Warburton 
Review (Commonwealth of Australia, 2014).  In contrast to expectations, impact of 
the RET on household electricity prices (NPV) is roughly neutral over the period 
2015-2030 (Warburton Review, 2014, 77; ACIL, 2014). Further, as in Figure 3.10, 
extending the time scale to 2040 suggests that average retail electricity prices would 
be slightly higher for residential, commercial and industrial consumers in the longer 
term if the pre-amendment RET was abolished. Removing the RET “eventually leads 
to higher wholesale electricity prices because of the absence of additional (low 
marginal cost) renewable generation and less over-supply of generation capacity in 
the market” (Warburton Review, 2014, 77). This is known as the ‘merit order’ effect, 
where the effects of additional RE generation increase supply in the wholesale market. 
The extent of the RET distributional consequences is dependent on this effect, as well 
as the ‘pass-through’ of these wholesale price changes to consumers at the retail level, 
and the impact of any exemptions from the RET scheme (Cludius, Forrest and 
MacGill, 2015, 49). The 2013-14 contribution of these components to the average 
prices paid by consumers is summarised in Figure 3.9. 
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Figure 3.9:Average Australian Residential Electricity Costs Breakdown, 2013-14 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Warburton Review, 2014, 18, with data from the AEMC 
Residential Electricity Price Trends Report, Dec 2013 for FY2013-14 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.10 compares the percentage change in electricity prices for consumers, if the 
RET was removed, where the 0% baseline represents the pre-amendment RET as the 
reference point. This demonstrates that repealing the RET leads to lower prices in the 
short time for consumers (in 2013-14 this cost was 4% of total costs, see Figure 3.9). 
However, over time the reduction of supply in the electricity market would cause an 
increase beyond 2020. The net effect of this to 2040 is therefore slightly higher costs 
to the consumer if the RET was repealed. A number of other models submitted to the 
2014 Review also concluded this negligible impact on electricity prices for consumers 
(BNEF, 2014; ROAM, 2014; SKM, 2012 in Warburton Review, 2014, 18). The 
Federal Government’s justification of the 2015 amendment to reduce the LRET target 
on the basis of the harm to electricity consumers is therefore at odds with the initial 
objectives of the policy (Hunt and Macfarlane, 2015; Commonwealth of Australia, 
2015). It is furthermore an unfounded claim in the Warburton Review modelling. 
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Figure 3.10: Change in Average Retail Electricity Prices for Residential, 
Commercial and Industrial Consumers if Pre-Amendment RET is Removed 
 
 
Source: ACIL Allen, in Warburton Review, 2014, 38 
 
 
3.5.3 Equity Concerns and the Exemption Amendment 
A significant concern in the academic literature on the impact of Australia’s energy 
policies is the concessions given to EITE industries (Cludius, Forrest and MacGill, 
2015; Perry, Rosewarne, White, 2013; Buckman, 2011; Clarke and Waschik, 2012). 
The Warburton Review raised the impact of any exemption changes for household 
and non-EITE industrial consumers. It estimated household electricity prices would 
add around $15 cumulatively to 2020 according to the modelling, and suggested an 
even greater burden would be faced by non-EITE industry with higher costs and no 
compensation (Warburton Review, 2014, 82). This represents a transfer of wealth 
from consumers, SME’s and certain large-scale industry toward large emissions 
intensive industry, as there is an additional cost burden faced at the retail level 
through electricity price premiums. EITE industries receive the benefit of lower 
wholesale prices without the price impact at the retail level from the merit order effect 
(Cludius, Forrest and MacGill, 2015, 47-48)14. This issue is further exacerbated by the 
amendment to 100% exemption, as this places an increased burden on those 
remaining within the scheme.   
 
                                                   
14  This  study  uses  time  series  regression  to  examine  these  effects  and  their  distributional  implications.    
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Further, the 2014 CCA Review questions the qualification for exemptions based on 
emissions intensity rather than electricity consumption (CCA Review, 2014, 36-38). 
This may have disproportionate impact on certain industries, for example, the 
industries highlighted in Figure 3.11. The inclusion of the partial exemptions in the 
RET in 2010 was based reduce the impact of the synchronisation of the RET with the 
carbon tax and subsequent emissions trading scheme, which also included EITE 
exemptions. None of these considerations appeared to factor into the bilateral decision 
to increase exemptions for EITE firms to 100%.  
 
Figure 3.11: Emissions Intensity and Electricity Intensity of Select EITE 
Industry 
 
Source: CCA, 2014, 38; Department of the Environment data, emissions data for FY 
2007 and 2008, revenue data for FY 2005 to 2008. 
 
 
The distributional consequences of this amendment are exacerbated by the 
concentration of the beneficiaries. Those who qualify for the ‘highly emissions 
intensive’ category made up 97% of partial exemption certificates issued in 2013 
(ACIL, 2014, A-55). As highlighted by the Independent Pricing and Regulatory 
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Tribunal (IPART), “these exemptions raise the costs of complying with the scheme 
for all other customers, particularly as the exempted industries can be large users of 
electricity and account for a significant proportion of electricity use in Australia” 
(IPART, 2012, 11). According to ACIL modelling, this proportion of exempted 
electricity consumption is projected to increase to 20% with the 2015 total exemption 
amendment, an increase from the 13% of liable electricity omitted under the EITE 
exemptions under the pre-amendment partial exemption scheme (Warburton Review, 
2014, 81). Further, these exemptions are concentrated to particular industries, as 
demonstrated in Figure 3.12. The predominant beneficiaries of the 100% exemption 
amendment are overwhelmingly the non-ferrous materials and production industry. 
The concentration of this industry means these exemptions benefit a small number of 
firms, namely several large-scale firms in the aluminium industry. The reduction of 
burden to these selected agents is therefore at the expense of consumers and other 
industry.  
 
 
Figure 3.12: Grouped EITE Industry Exemptions, 2014 by Exemptions Issued 
 
Source: produced from Clean Energy Regulator data, 2015 
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3.5.4 Situational Validation: Findings from the IAD Application  
The IAD Framework is a useful tool for revealing potential equity issues and their 
implications. Claims of economic costs, increased electricity prices for consumers, 
and an unnecessary burden on fossil fuel industry are unfounded. The IAD framework 
highlights that these justifications are perpetuated where they align with the interests 
of agents in the policy process, who are the beneficiaries of the potential outcomes of 
the 2015 amendments. Further, the perpetuation of orthodox economics approaches to 
evaluation are used to justify these normative positions, under the guise of ‘scientific 
objectivity’. The use of ‘efficiency’ and economic costs in this way obscures their 
prioritisation over important distributional concerns in policy evaluation.  
3.6 Application Summary 
This preliminary application has demonstrated how the framework developed in 
Chapter 2 may be implemented to provide a pluralistic and interdisciplinary approach 
to environmental policy evaluation. This chapter has provided examples of how the 
IAD framework can be implemented in evaluating the intended outcomes of the 2015 
amendments to Australia’s RET. Following each section, the contributions of this 
preliminary application were discussed to highlight the implications of using the IAD 
framework to improve environmental policy evaluation. It is concluded that the 2015 
amendments are at odds with the stated objectives of increasing RE generation and 
reducing emissions in the REE Act. Further, the justifications provided by the 
Government and in the Warburton Review do not withstand scrutiny. These results 
highlight the strengths of using the IAD framework for evaluating environmental 
policy, as it is able to engage with the interests of agents in the policy process and 
contribute to evaluative knowledge building. The implications of this application and 
potential future research will be discussed in the following concluding chapter. 
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Conclusions 
“The contemporary political debate does not pit pragmatists against ideologists – 
rather, it pits advocates for the national interest against captives of vested interest.” 
- John Hewson  
Former Liberal Party Leader 1990-1994 
1992 Alfred Deakin Lecture 
(The Australian, 15 October 1992, in Warhurst, 2010, 348) 
 
This quote presents a common frustration with the policy process. The alternative 
approach to environmental policy evaluation presented in this thesis can be seen as a 
contribution to the mitigation of this problem. The modified IAD framework 
improves on current approaches by encouraging theoretical knowledge building and 
explicitly engaging with the interests of agents in policy.  
 
The RET Amendments  
The implementation of the IAD framework to evaluate the 2015 RET amendments 
presents a number of policy implications for the Australian RE sector. The 
inconsistency of the 2015 amendments with the established objectives of the policy, 
questions the legitimacy of these amendments in benefitting the RE industry or the 
common interest. The resulting outcomes of these amendments are likely to dampen 
the success of the RET, and undermines the stability of the RE industry in the near 
future. This is at odds with global trends toward increasing RE generation and 
questions Australia’s commitment to the global mitigation of climate change.  
 
Chapter 3 provides applied examples of the different components of the modified 
IAD framework in practice. However, there are several other aspects of these issues to 
be considered in order to continue knowledge building using this. This may draw in a 
number of other external factors, action situations, or considerations for the evaluation 
of the intended outcomes relevant for environmental policy. For example, equity 
issues in environmental policies may have distributional consequences that extend to 
socio-economic factors such as age, employment status, household size or regional 
factors (Buchs, Bardlsey, Duwe, 2011, 297-298). 
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Further, this application did not test for what Fischer calls “second-order” evaluative 
concerns (Fischer, 1995). As highlighted in Table 2.2, these are broader notions of 
systems-based social evaluation. Further primary research is needed to provide 
comprehensive conclusions with regard to these broader participatory, or social 
choice concerns. This speaks to the need for multiple contributors and perspectives in 
furthering the improvement of environmental policy evaluation, a notion that stems 
from the nature of interdisciplinary knowledge building. In this context, progress in 
environmental policy evaluation is a participatory and pluralistic process. 
 
The Modified IAD Framework: Contributing to Knowledge Building 
The flexibility of the IAD framework is highlighted by the modification and 
application in Chapter 2 and 3. While each framework is predisposed to certain 
applications and the use of certain theories and methods, the flexibility of the IAD 
framework when heterodox theories and models are embraced was demonstrated. 
This is a key strength attributable to the incorporation of an interdisciplinary approach. 
The framework can characterise a specific policy or it can be tailored to a more 
focused policy task such as evaluation. This reaffirms the continuing development of 
the IAD literature through further applications or modifications. The increasing 
diversity of IAD applications (see for example, Austen, 2015) is a testament to this, 
and this thesis contributes a new direction for the framework and heterodox analysis. 
 
Contributions to two areas of theoretical synthesis have furthered the tradition of 
synthesis as knowledge building. First, the synthesis between the ecological and 
institutional approaches is a coherent progression of two disciplines that conceptualise 
phenomena in compatible way. This was demonstrated in the link between the 
ecological criticisms of economic approaches to environmental policy evaluation, and 
the subsequent proposition of Ostrom’s institutional framework as an alternative 
approach in light of these criticisms. Second, a contribution has been made in linking 
the existing theoretical traditions of policy framework theory with developments in 
evaluation theory. The unification of these two extensive research traditions was 
shown to be well suited to environmental policy, and may be equally applicable to 
non-environmental policy areas to further the pursuit of knowledge building. This is 
particularly useful when faced with limited engagement with evaluation itself or 
relevant theoretical developments, as was the case in the RET application. 
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Further Research for the Modified IAD Framework 
This provisional application has highlighted the interrelated impacts of the various 
components in the IAD framework. This issue may not be unique to an application in 
policy evaluation. For example, the importance of biophysical conditions in shaping 
the other exogenous variables, such as rules-in-use or political economic context is 
underemphasised in the framework. Further research would be valuable in 
formulating an explicit way to deal with this potential self-reflexivity. The 
rationalistic tendency of this framework may place an overemphasis on boundaries 
and categorisation at the expense of these considerations.  
 
Although the framework encouraged a less prescriptive approach that is open to a 
range of theories and methods, a balanced range was difficult to achieve in this 
provisional application. This may point to the need to introduce more constructivist 
elements to counterbalance the categorical elements of the IAD framework. For 
example, Fischer (1995) highlights the analytical significance of discourse analysis at 
all four levels of evaluative considerations (Fischer, 1995). This is also reaffirmed by 
Clement, who attempts to encourage this more constructivist analysis in the IAD 
framework with the inclusion of ‘discourses’ as an external factor (Clement, 2012, 1). 
A productive way forward may be the inclusion of discourse analysis in either 
Clement or Fischer’s form, and doing so may extend the explanatory capacity of the 
framework further.  
 
Another consideration that emerged from this case study was the potential formation 
of coalitions that emerged with agents at the collective choice level. While the 
existence of these relationships was piecemeal and selective, evidence of alliances for 
example, between green groups and the RE industry or between state governments 
and the fossil fuel industries, came to light through this process. The ‘coalition’ as a 
unit of analysis in the ACF may therefore further strengthen the IAD framework in 
certain instances. Recent developments in policy framework literature highlight a 
focus on knowledge building through combining existing frameworks rather than the 
development of new frameworks (Niles and Lubell, 2012; Nowlin, 2011; Petridou, 
2014, S27; Cairney, 2013). Synthesising the ACF and IAD framework may be a 
fruitful line of future research. 
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The proposition of this framework has major implications for how we evaluate 
environmental policy by rewiring the relationship between academic research and 
current policy evaluation. However, this may be difficult, as it requires overcoming 
the hegemony of orthodox economic techniques in current environmental policy 
evaluation (Beder, 2011). Further research into overcoming these entrenched links 
and forging new relationships between this approach and its translation to policy 
evaluation practice would be a progressive next step.  
 
A continuing difficulty of this framework is discerning the theories and models that 
are relevant for the scope of analysis. Schlager critiques the lack of “metarules” for 
analysing complex policy issues, and the framework’s inability “to provide any 
guideposts to direct the analyst to particular rules and not to others” (Schlager, 2007, 
309; Hayden, 2011, 468-469). Yet, a set of ‘metarules’ may become overly 
prescriptive, a notion critiqued in Section 2.3.2 regarding the orthodox economic IAD 
applications. Rejecting prescriptive tendencies and embracing a range of theories and 
models makes the determination of relevant factors for each IAD component a 
challenging task. However, this difficulty is an important part of evaluation as a 
process for knowledge building. Determining the relevance of specific theories and 
methods is a process that necessarily includes critical scrutiny from multiple 
perspectives. A heterodox pluralist approach is better suited to this, with broader 
considerations of theories and models that can embrace potential conflicts.   
 
Concluding Remarks 
The proposed framework approach to environmental policy evaluation therefore 
improves current evaluation in a number of ways. First, the framework is a 
mechanism for systematically engaging with the interests of agents in policy. Second, 
this approach is highly flexible, able to discern theories and models and incorporate 
various rationalistic or constructivist components on a context-specific basis. Third, 
explanatory capacity is improved by explicitly grounding the framework in an 
engagement with normativity. Finally, this approach promotes interdisciplinary 
considerations of environmental issues that are, by nature, interdisciplinary. This 
provides a foundation for a holistic engagement with disparate literature, encouraging 
academic disciplines to talk to, rather than ‘talk past’, each other.  
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Appendix 1 
The 2015 Amendment to the RET Minimum RE Generation 
 
 
Table A1: The 2015 Amendments to the LRET Fixed Figure RET 
 
Source: REE Act, 2000 and REE Act, Amendment Explanatory Memorandum, 2015 
 
Figure A1: RET Minimum RE Generation Changes, 2015 Amendment 
 
Notes:    
1.   The   2012-­‐2014   figures   under   the   2015   amendment   are   the   actual   figures   for   RE   generated  
electricity  in  those  years,  which  are  significantly  more  than  the  figures  required  by  the  legislation.  
  
2.   In  this  table,  the  reduction  from  2020  to  2021  represents  the  2012  commitment  to  include  waste  
coal  mine   gas   (WCMG).“The   annual   targets   are   effectively   increased  by   850  GWh   to   accommodate  
WCMG   fired  generation  without  displacing   renewable  energy  under   the  RET”   (REE  Act  Amendment  
Bill,   2015,   9-­‐10).   The   additional   amount   above   the   target   by   2020   is   therefore   the   electricity  
generated  by  WCMG  and   is   removed   from   the  overall   target  after  2020   to  ensure   the  41,000  GWh  
target  is  entirely  generated  by  sources  defined  by  the  Act  as  renewables.  
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2021 - 
2030 
Original 
Target 
 12,300   14,200   16,100   18,000   22,600   27,200   31,800   36,400   41,000   41,000  
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Target 
 16,763  19,088  16,950   18,850   21,431   26,031   28,637   31,244   33,850  33,000  
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Appendix 2 
Estimates of Marginal Abatement Cost  
 
 
Table A2: Range of Marginal Abatement Cost Estimates per tonne of CO2 
Emissions  
Sources: ACIL, 2014; Frontier Economics, 2014; Deloitte, 2014; SKM, 2012; 
Productivity Commission, 2011. The following: Daley and Edis (2011); DCC (2010); 
DCCEE (2011e); ERAA (2005); Ministerial Council on Energy (2002) sourced from 
Productivity Commission, 2011, 85. 
  
Note:  All  2014  figures  are  pre-­‐amendment  RET  calculations.  All  dollar  figures  are  in  the  dollars  of  the  
year  of  estimation.  
Cost 
($/t CO2-e) 
Duration Year Source 
Notes 
(From source) 
25-35 
62-68 
2014-2030 
2014-2040 
2014 
ACIL Allen for 
Panel Review 
Second range applies 
discount factor 
55-65 2015-2030 2014 
Frontier Economics 
for the AEMC 
Noted that this will 
decrease over time 
72 
82 
2020 
2030 
2014 
Deloitte for ACCI, 
BCA and MCA 
Used LGC costs only 
40 2013-2030 2012 
SKM MMA for 
2012 CCA Review 
Method from report 
by Dept. Climate 
Change 
37-111 2011-2030 2011 
Productivity 
Commission 
2009-10 data 
30-70 2012 -2030 2011 
Daley and Edis, 
Grattan Institute 
Contingent on 
certificate price 
44-73 - 2002 
Ministerial Council 
on Energy 
- 
60-80 - 2005 
Electricity Retailers 
Association of 
Australia (ERAA) 
- 
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Appendix 3 
Estimations of Fossil Fuel Subsidies 
 
Table A3: Range of Fossil Fuel Subsidies Estimates in Australia 
Source Estimation Notes from Text 
Ashiabor & Blazey, 2007: 
Quoting an Australian 
senate committee report 
titled “Australia’s 
Greenhouse Future”, Nov 
2000, xxxvi 
Direct subsidies: $2bn 
AUD 
 
Indirect subsidies: $4bn 
AUD 
Indirect subsidies include: 
tax incentives for industry, 
start-up grants, preferential 
purchasing agreements for 
oil and biased market 
structures. 
Riedy & Diesendorf, 2003, 
Energy Policy 
$6.54bn AUD in 2003 
Note this excludes the 
“many subsidies cannot be 
calculated”. 
Peel, Campbell & Denniss, 
2014; Grudnoff, 2013 (in 
Peel et al., 2014): 
Australia Institute Reports 
Expenditures and 
concessions: $3.2bn AUD 
in 2013-14 financial year. 
Federal subsidies were 
$4.5bn in 2013. 
The year discrepancy was 
based on the timing of the 
annual releases by the 
Australia Institute 
Bast, et al., 2014, 
Oil Change International 
“Fossil Fuel Bailout” 
US $3.5 bn per year 
[$4 bn AUD at Nov 2014 
exchange rate at the time 
of paper release] 
A calculation the subsidies 
for exploration by fossil 
fuel companies 
Coady, et al., 2015 
IMF Working Paper 
$24.6 bn USD in 2015 
[$41 bn AUD in July 2015 
at exchange rate at the 
time of the paper release] 
2015 projection, attempts 
to include the major 
environmental, social and 
health externalities 
associated with coal, 
petroleum and gas. 
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